WAGE ASSIGNMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA-THE NEED
FOR JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
PAUL W. BRUTONt

Problems created by wage assignments are far from new, as legal
problems go; but developments of recent years have greatly increased
their importance. Employers, particularly those operating businesses
of any size, are being called upon to make wage deductions-to become
in effect collecting agents for a great variety of purposes: union dues,
contributions to employee welfare associations, hospital insurance, purchase of necessaries on the employees' accounts, payment of personal
loans made to employees, purchase of war bonds, and others that might
be mentioned. These deductions are frequently authorized by arrangements which are in form or substance partial wage assignments executed
by the interested employees. The employer may favor or oppose the
particular project involved or he may be a disinterested stakeholder, but,
whatever his attitude, he is vitally concerned with the new legal obligations which may be imposed upon him. If a number of employees execute a series of partial wage assignments, must the employer assume the
accounting and administrative burden of splitting wage payments
between the assigning employees and the assignees, or is he free to disregard the assignments and make full payment to the employees without
risk of incurring legal liability to the assignees? 1 In these days of
labor shortage, additional office burdens may not be lightly undertaken.
Or if after an assignment has been executed the employee notifies the
employer that the arrangement is revoked, what course should the employer follow in the event that the assignment purports to be irrevocable? May he safely make payment to either assignor or assignee?
These are simple situations; the law should supply equally simple
answers, but unfortunately it does not-at least in Pennsylvania.
Doubt as to the legal effect of a partial wage assignment in Pennsylvania seems to be due in no small measure to the lack of any generally
available and comprehensive survey of the decisions in this jurisdiction.
The present collection and analysis of the cases is offered in the hope
that it will fill this need and make some contribution to the future clarification of the law.
I A. B., 1929, LL. B., 1929, University of California; J. S. D., 193o, Yale University. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Author: CASES ON TAXATION
(1940) ; and articles in legal periodicals.
i. Of course, the partial assignee is also interested. What security does he receive
when he takes what purports to be an irrevocable wage assignment?
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The earliest reported Pennsylvania decision on the legal effect of
a partial wage assignment was rendered in 1856 by a well-known Philadelphia jurist, Judge Hare, 2 then sitting in the Philadelphia District
Court. But the opinion in Fairgrieves v. Lehigh Navigation Company 3 is also of particular interest because the views there forcefully
expressed have not, in the intervening years, been authoritatively appraised. In fact, a review of subsequent cases will disclose doubt as to
the present standing of the Fairgrieves decision. It is appropriate,
therefore, to begin this study with a consideration of Judge Hare's
views.
Fairgrieves, an employee of the Lehigh Navigation Company, was
indebted to Mrs. Erwin for rent. He executed an agreement that his
landlady should receive fifteen dollars per month out of his pay from
the company until the debt for rent was paid. There was no doubt
that this purported to be a partial assignment of Fairgrieves' wages, and
the company was notified accordingly. Thereafter the company paid
Iairgrieves his wages in full and Mrs. Erwin brought an action of
assumpsit against the company in the name of Fairgrieves to her own
use. Procedurally, this was simply an attempt to adapt to the needs of
a partial assignee the "to use" form of action which for some time had
been generally employed by total assignees. 4 The court held that pay2. John Innes Clark Hare (i8i6-i9o5) ; elected in 1851 to the District Court of
Philadelphia, of which he became President Judge in x867; transferred to President
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 2 in 1875, which position he retained until
1896; Professor of Institutes of Law in the Law School (then the Department of
Law) of the University of Pennsylvania, 1868-88, Emeritus Professor of Constitutional
Law, 1888-x9o5; Vice-Provost and Provost of the Law Academy of Philadelphia,
1862-1905; author of CONTRACrS (1887) and AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW (2 vols.

1889). "His principal decisions are preserved in the Legal Intelligencer and the Philadelphia Reports. These Reports of a local County Court are not always accessible to
lawyers in other parts of the state, while outside of the state they are to be found only
in the larger law libraries. Nevertheless, Judge Hare's opinions rise so far above the
ordinary level even of opinions of courts of last resort, that it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that his name is better known to the more learned portion of the profession
than that of any other judge who has never held a position on an appellate court. Not
long ago a member of the Bar of Philadelphia was addressing the Supreme Court of
the United States. In the course of his argument he referred to one of Judge Hare's
opinions, making some slight apology for bringing to the notice of the Court the opinion of a nisi prius tribunal. The Chief Justice said: 'We are familiar with many of
the opinions of Judge Hare and no apology is necessary for bringing to our notice any
decision of his bearing on the question under discussion.'" Lewis, John Innes Clark
Hare (19o6) 54 Am. L. REG. 711, 712.
3. 2 Phila. 182 (Pa. 1856).

4. It is familiar learning that assignments were first given effect in equity. By
the end of the eighteenth century the courts of law adopted the doctrines of equity regarding total assignments and allowed the assignee to sue in the name of the assignor.
2 W'ILISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 410; Note, PartialAssignments (1927) 13
CORN. L. Q. 129, reprinted in SFLECTF READINGS ON CONTRACTS (1931) 86o. Early
Pennsylvania decisions indicate that when an action was brought in the name of the
total assignor to the use of the assignee, the assignor had no interest in or control over
such action. M'Cullum v. Coxe, i Dallas 139 (Pa. 1785); Steele v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
3 Binney 306 (Pa. 181i).
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ment to the assigning employee, even after notice of the assignment, was
a defense to the company and gave judgment for the defendant. Referring to the instrument executed by Fairgrieves, Judge Hare said:
"The question is, whether this instrument operated as an
equitable assignment and precluded the defendants from paying
Fairgrieves, after receiving a notice to the contrary from Mrs.
Erwin. We are clearly of opinion that it did not; first, because of
the partial nature of the assignment; and next, on account of the
nature of the interest assigned." 5
The judge's first reason for his conclusion-"the partial nature of
the assignment"-was the now familiar point that a creditor may not
be permitted to split an entire cause of action without the debtor's consent, for to do so would increase the debtor's burdens beyond those of
the original contract by requiring the debtor to assume the risk of separate suits and the task of making separate settlements with the assignor
and assignee. 6 The opinion is very clear and specific to the effect that
the decision deals only with "the rights of the debtor" and it is not denied "that the assignment of part of a debt may be binding, as between
those who are parties to it, and may entitle the assignee to bring suit in
the name of the assignor against a defaulting debtor, because such a
course merely calls upon the latter to pay the debt, without making him
responsible for the appropriation of the money after it is paid." 7 This
statement indicates that if the Lehigh Company had not paid Fairgrieves, it could be held liable in some form of action by Mrs. Erwin
which would not have required it to divide the wages between the
assignor and assignee. What this form of action would be is not
stated.'
5. 2 Phila. 182 (Pa. I856).
6. For his authority, Judge Hare relied upon the leading cases of Mandeville v.
Welch, 5 Wheat. 277 (U. S. 182o) and Gibson v. Cooke, 2o Pick. 15 (Mass. 1838) as
holding "that a partial assignment of a debt will not bind the debtor either in equity
or at law, nor deprive him of the right to pay the whole to the assignor, after notice
that part has been transferred to the assignee." 2 Phila. 182, 183 (Pa. 1856). Mandeville v. Welch, chiefly relied upon 'by Judge Hare and cited in many of the subsequent
Pennsylvania cases, caused some confusion in the early cases of many jurisdictions
because of failure to limit it to actions at law. However, even before the Fairgrieves
decision, Justice Story, who wrote the opinion, had so limited it. 2 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1843) §§ 1043-4. Gibson v. Cooke, miscited by Judge Hare as
"Gibson v. Clark," was also subsequently so limited by the Massachusetts Court.
James v. City of Newton, i42 Mass. 366, 8 N. E. 122 (1886). Cf. Gilman v. Raymond, 235 Mass. 284, 127 N. E. 794 (1920) following Gibson v. Cooke in an action at
law. The rule was not changed by the adoption of the real-party-in-interest statutes.

1936) §

2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
7.2 Phila. 182, 184 (Pa. I856).

442.

8. Since Judge Hare referred to a "suit in the name of the assignor against a
defaulting debtor," he apparently had in mind an action at law, rather than a procee&
ing in equity. Did he mean that the debtor would pay the full amount of the debt into
court for distribution to the assignor and assignee? But how would recovery by the
partial assignee in such an action be reconciled with the statement that a partial assignment did not bind the debtor either at law or in equity? See the discussion of Dia-
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Let us now turn to the second reason for giving judgment in favor
of the defendant. Were the partial assignment aspect of the case "less
clear than it would seem to be," the opinion reads, "there would still remain a formidable objection to the title of the assignee, growing out of
the nature of the right assigned." 9 This was the right to Fairgrieves'
salary as a clerk which was not earned at the time of the assignment.
In the words of the Judge, "The interest assigned was, therefore, purely
contingent, and depended for its existence, not only upon the will of
the assignor, but on that of the Company, who might have discharged
him from their employment, and thus rendered the claim of the assignee
wholly nugatory." 10 Consequently, the interest assigned did not have
sufficient "actual existence" to make the assignment good at law. Only
the chancellor, in the exercise of his discretion, could enforce the rights
claimed by the assignee. This, Judge Hare was clear, the chancellor
should not do:
"If the wages of toil can be pledged before they are earned, for
the payment of debts, or for the purpose of obtaining credit; if the
creditor can step in and intercept them in their passage from the
hand of the employer to that of the workman, in what will the condition of the debtor differ from that of a slave? His life and limbs
may still be his own, but the right to use them for his own benefit
will be at an end, or subject to the control of another." 11
In other words, public policy forbids enforcement of an assignment of
future earnings because of the burden which would thus be placed on
the earning power of the employee. The Judge explicitly refused to
make any distinction in this respect between an assignment of unearned
wages from an existing employment, which was the case before him,
and an assignment of wages from future employment. He thought that
"if equity will sustain and enforce such transactions in any case, it must
be prepared to do it in all." 12
mond Textile Machine Works, Inc. v. International Batting Mills, 7 D. & C. 113 (C.
P. Phila. 1925) at p. 34 infra. Perhaps all Judge Hare meant to hold was that no
recovery could be had against a debtor who had paid the assignor in full prior to the
commencement of the suit, which would leave open the question of recovery in the
absence of such payment.
9. 2 Phila. 182, 184 (Pa. 1856).

io. Ibid.

ii. Id. at 185.
12. Ibid. There was another aspect of the case which troubled the judge. "Nothing

could be more useless than to hold an assignment of future wages valid, and yet leave
it to the choice of the assignor whether the work shall be done, for this would be to
decide in favor of a right, and then make it dependent upon the caprice or will of the
person who created it. . . . Hence the intervention of equity, to be really effectual,
must go to the length of enforcing the performance of the task which the assignor has
impliedly promised to accomplish, and prohibiting its interruption until the assignee
has obtained full satisfaction. . . . The difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of
doing this, and the mischief which it would produce if done, are too plain for comment,
and render further argument superfluous." Id. at 186-7. The cases are clearly against
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Such were the views of an eminent Pennsylvania judge in the
middle of the last century. Much has happened in the law of assignment since Mrs. Erwin failed to collect her rent in a suit against the
Lehigh Navigation Company, but the issues so clearly raised in that litigation have yet to be laid to rest in this Commonwealth, and it is time
that they should be. Let us see what the years have produced in the
way of judicial affirmation or refutation of Judge Hare's views.
II
The reported cases on partial assignments, which arose in fie years
immediately following the Fairgrieves decision involved the rights of
the partial assignee as against subsequent assignees, attaching creditors,
and pledgees of the assignor. It should have been clear that this was
quite a different question from the one presented in the Fairgrievescase.
The dispute was over the right to the proceeds as between the partial
assignee and persons claiming through the assignor and, since all claimants were parties to the proceeding, there was no question of the debtor's
having to make separate settlements or being subjected to a multiplicity
of suits. 1 3

Apparently, however, the matter did not seem this clear,

14
for the Fairgrievesdecision was discussed and its effect left in doubt.
The most important of this group of cases is Oakes v. Oram 5
which appears to be the first partial assignment case to reach the Supreme Court, which it did in 1867. It arose in the Common Pleas of
Luzerne County and involved an action by Oakes on a claim against
Oram. Attachment was issued against the D. L. & W. Railroad for

the Judge on this. Effect may be given to an assignment, although at the time of the
assignment the assignor had not yet performed his contract with the debtor. Philadelphia v. Lockbardt, 73 Pa. 21I (873).
See also the following cases which sustain the

assignment of contingent interests aind expectancies: Moeser, Adm'r v. Schneider, I58
Pa. 412, 27 Atl. io88 (1893) ; Kuhn's Estate, 163 Pa. 438, 3o Atl. 215 (1894); Norris's Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 At. I42 (1938) ; Day & Sharpe's Assigned Estate, 21 Pa.

Super. II8

(1902).

13. Clearly the partial assignee should prevail over persons standing in no better

position than the assignor who is bound in equity by the assignment. Webster v. Sterling Finance Co., 173 S. W. (2d) 928 (Mo. 1943) ; Stewart v. Kane, II S. W. (2d)

971 (Mo. App. 1938) ; Burditt v. Porter, 63 Vt. 296, 21 Atl. 955 (I89I) ; Petrus v.
Pierick, 199 Wis. 147, 255 N. W. 695 (1929). Cf. Thiel v. John Week Lumber Co.,
137 Wis. 272, IX8 N. W. 8o2 (1908) (the assignor may recover from a debtor who
refuses to honor a partial assignment) and Morris v. Nelson, 124 Kan. 127, 257 Pac.
729 (927)
involving priorities between assignees when the debtor expressly accepts

a later partial assignment and refuses to honor earlier ones.

14. Two early decisions by Judge Hare are difficult to appraise because of lack
2io (Pa. 1858) he reaffirmed
the general doctrine of the Fairgrievescase, that a partial assignment will be "invalid,"
unless it receives the assent of the debtor. The plaintiff prevailed on his attachment,
but who the plaintiff was is not clear. In Miller v. Insurance Co., 5 Phila. 12 (Pa.
1862) the partial assignee prevailed over the assignor's attaching creditors, but on the
ground that the debtor had recognized the assignment as binding on him. The Judge
expressed doubt as to whether or not a partial assignment, which is "invalid as against
the debtor, if he thinks fit to disregard it, is equally so against the assignor and those
who claim under him as creditors by attachment."
15. 43 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 520 (Pa. 1867).

of reported facts. In McCaffrey v. Cassidy, 3 Phila.
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money which the road owed Oram on account of coal he had supplied. The railroad admitted that it owed the money, but stated
that it had received various orders drawn by Oram in favor of several
of his creditors other than Oakes. It assumed the position of a stakeholder and indicated willingness to pay whatever persons were entitled
to the fund. The holders of the orders appeared as parties to the proceeding claiming as partial assignees on the theory that the orders were
partial assignments of the debt owed Oram by the railroad.
The case was referred to a member of the bar as an auditor who
reported. in favor of Oakes, the attaching creditor, as against the other
creditors claiming as partial assignees. His reasoning contained two
points, the first of which was apparently based on the Fairgrievesdecision: (i) if prior to the attachment the railroad had paid Oram, such
payment would have been a defense to an action brought against it in
the name of Oram to the use of the partial assignees; (2) upon attachment, the attaching creditor succeeded to all the rights of Oram, plus the
right that the railroad should not voluntarily pay any claim on the fund
which it might, at its option, successfully resist. The weakness of this
argument is that it ignores the fact that a partial assignment may create
enforcible rights against the assignor regardless of whether or not the
partial assignee has a cause of action against the debtor."'
Judge Conyngham of the Common Pleas Court recognized the
error of the auditor's reasoning and held that the partial assignees
should prevail over the attaching creditor, on the ground that a partial
assignment is binding on the parties to it and an attaching creditor of
the assignor, standing in the latter's place, must be considered such a
party. However, the portion of the opinion which is of particular interest here is that containing the discussion of the Fairgrieves case and
the partial assignee's rights against the debtor. Reference is made to
Judge Hare's "elaborate opinion" which is cited for "the clear and plain
rule . . .that the assignment or transfer of several portions of a single
fund, creates no indebtedness of the person owing the debt to the several transferees, unless he accept or assent to the transaction, and expressly or impliedly promise to pay, under circumstances sufficient to
furnish a proper consideration." 17 According to Judge Conyngham,
the Fairgrieves case, among others, "may be considered as fully sustaining the doctrine that the assignment of portions of a claim cannot
be made available at law to recover from the original debtors." 18 But
it has been pointed out that Judge Hare said he did not deny that a partial assignment "may entitle the assignee to bring suit in the name of the
i6. See the cases cited note 13 s=pra.
17. 43 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 520, 521 (Pa.

18. Ibid.

1867).
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assignor against a defaulting debtor," 11 so long as the latter is not
required to make separate settlements with assignor and assignee. It is
not clear how this statement would be reconciled with Judge Conyngham's interpretation of the Fairgrieves decision.
Oakes v. Oram was taken from the Common Pleas Court to the
Supreme Court, which, being evenly divided, was unable to reach a decision. 20 Probably because of this fact, the case was never officially reported and was not brought to the general attention of the bench and
bar until it was printed in the Legal Intelligencer in 1886 with a prefatory statement of the editor to the effect that it would be interesting
to the profession and tend to a settlement of the question regarding the
effect of partial assignments in Pennsylvania. 2
Although Oakes v. Oram may have contributed to the settlement of
the partial assignee's rights against the assignor's attaching creditors,
it offered little clarification of the assignee's rights against the nonassenting debtor. Judge Conyngham had indicated that the partial
assignee could not recover at law and had also expressed doubt as to
whether or not any recovery might be had in equity. As a matter of
fact, it was becoming established at this time in many jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania that the rule against splitting a cause of action,
which prevented recovery at law by the partial assignee, did not apply
in equity.2 2

The reason was that in an equitable proceeding the partial

assignee might join the assignor and any other parties claiming an interest in the chose, thus making possible an adjudication of the assignee's
right without subjecting the debtor to more than ofte suit or more than
one settlement. But the doubt as to Pennsylvania law involved more
than the question whether or not the courts would adopt the rule permitting recovery in equity. The further question was how would the
rule, if adopted, be applied in the light of the unique development of
equity in this state.
19. See p. 21 supra.
2o. The court did decide that one of the orders was a bill of exchange rather than
an assignment, because it did not state that it was drawn on a particular fund. This
was an application of well-recognized law. See Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass. 383, 24
N. E. 21o (i8go) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRacTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 425. As to the other
orders, which qualified as equitable assignments, the court was able to reach no conclusion, with the result that the judgment below stood.
21. "In view of the doubt expressed by Judge Trunkey in regard to the law of
Pennsylvania (see Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. 299), relating to assignments of part of a
fund, the following report of Oakes v. Oram will be interesting to the profession and
tend to a settlement of the question. The ability of the late Judge Conyngham and of
the late G. B. Nicholson, Esq., justify the printing of the report and opinion of the
court below in full." To this statement was attached the footnote: "See also Geist's
Appeal, 104 Pa. 351." 43 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 520 (Pa. 1867). G. B. Nicholson was
the auditor. The Ruple case is discussed at p. 32 infra, and Geis's Appeal in note
47 infra.
22. James v. City of Newton, I42 Mass. 366, 8 N. E. 122 (1886) ; 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 443; 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1843)

§§ 1043-4.
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Separate courts of chancery have never existed in Pennsylvania,
but from the earliest days the courts have applied a goodly portion of
the law of equity through common law forms of action. Beginning
with the Act of 1836,23 the courts were given the usual chancery powers,
and thereafter equitable relief might be obtained through the customary bill in equity. However, the courts continued to apply equity,
when appropriate, in the common law actions. 24 The question therefore immediately arises: if the courts adopted the equitable rule for the
enforcement of partial assignments, would the rule not be applicable in a
common law action brought in the name of the assignor to the use of
the assignee, as well as in a proceeding initiated by a bill in equity? If
so, the distinction in other jurisdictions between actions at law and proceedings in equity by a partial assignee would have little significance in
this state. The cases discussed above give no indication that these
problems were recognized.
In 1871 the case of Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co.25 was decided by
the Supreme Court. Caldwell, being trustee for benefit of creditors of
a certain steamboat, held funds for distribution to the creditors, one of
whom was Hartupee & Co. which drew against its share of these funds,
to the extent of a portion thereof, in favor of Cuthbert. Caldwell refused to honor the draft on the ground that the drawer, Hartupee & Co.,
was indebted to a firm of which he was a member. Thereupon, an
action of assumpsit was brought against Caldwell, in the name of Hartupee & Co., to the use of Cuthbert. The theory of the suit was that
the draft operated as an equitable assignment to Cuthbert of a portion
26
of the proceeds owed by Caldwell, as trustee, to Hartupee & Co.
Counsel for Caldwell argued: "The order was not an assignment,
because it undertook to transfer only a portion of the fund in Caldwell's
hands." 27 The authority relied upon for this statement was Justice
Story's famous opinion in Mandeville v. Welch,2" which had also been
relied upon by Judge Hare in the Fairgrieves case and by Judge
Conyngham in Oakes v. Oram. The court made short work of this
23. Act of June I6, 1836, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17, § 281.
24. Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania (1885) 1 L. Q. REV. 455, reprinted in 2 SELcr EssAys IN ANGLo-AMFMCAN
LEGAL HisToRY (1908) 80.
25. 70 Pa. 74 (1871).

26. Stated more fully, the facts were: Dexter, being the owner of a steamboat
which was largely in debt, made a trust-mortgage of the boat to Caldwell and one
Coffin as trustees to secure $15,ooo for the benefit of the creditors, one of whom was
Hartupee & Co. Dexter gave three notes to Caldwell.for $5,ooo each, which were
paid at maturity, whereupon the trust-mortgage became void. Hartupee & Co.'s
order on Caldwell read: "Please pay Mr. John Cuthbert $1,5oo out of the proceeds of
the last note coming to us from the steamer Quickstep, with interest from date of said
note." Cuthbert transferred the draft to Morrow, who became the use-plaintiff. It
was admitted that Caldwell had a balance in his hands of about $1,700.
27. 70 Pa. 74, 77 (871).
28. 5 Wheat. 277 (U. S. 1820).
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argument and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. After stating that
the order was an equitable assignment, the court made this significant
observation: "This really practically answers Mandeville v. Welch,
which was in a court of common law, and the same assignment would
have been held good on the equity side of the same. In Pennsylvania,
in the present liberal state of the law, as to equitable assignments, there
can be no hesitation in recognizing this assignment in a common-law
form of action, and in saying in such a case it is not necessary to resort
to a court of equity." 29
Thus, the Supreme Court, in its first pronouncement on the subject, seemed to accept wholeheartedly the view that a partial assignment
would be recognized in equity and, therefore, would be given effect in
Pennsylvania in a common law action; just what effect is not clear. In
the case before the court, the assignee was permitted to recover from the
debtor, but under the circumstances the debtor was not burdened with
a multiplicity of suits or settlements. Caldwell as trustee was directed
to pay to the partial assignee the amount of the assignment and to pay
any balance due Hartupee & Co. to Caldwell's firm as a creditor of
Hartupee.3 0 The funds affected by the assignment were thus completely distributed in the one proceeding. But, did the Fairgrieves
decision remain law? Was a debtor with notice of a partial assignment
still free to ignore the assignee's interest by making full payment to the
assignor? The Supreme Court's brief opinion makes no reference to
the problem or to the Fairgrievescase, which, apparently, was not called
to the court's attention.
The development of the law was further complicated by the decision
two years later of Jermyn v. Moffitt, 3 1 which was the first wage assignment case to reach an appellate court in Pennsylvania. The employee
Leslie, prior to his employment by Jermyn and while he was employed
by the Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., executed the following assignment:
"In consideration of existing indebtedness to Patrick Moffitt,
I do hereby assign and set over to the said Moffitt five dollars a
month of my earnings, in the employment of the Delaware and
Hudson Canal Company, or with whomsoever I may be employed,
until the amount due said Moffitt is paid." 82
After this assignment Leslie went to work for Jermyn, and Moffitt
showed Jermyn the assignment which the latter refused to pay, claiming
Pa. 74, 79 (187).
30. "Under this state of facts the plaintiffs were entitled to the full amount of the
29. 70

order, with interest, and whatever balance remained of Hartupee & Co.'s interest under

the deed of trust belonged to the defendant under his offset of the two notes above
stated." Id. at 78.
31. 75 Pa. 399 (1874).
32. Id. at 400.
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that he had certain set-offs against the wages due Leslie. Moffitt
brought suit and obtained judgment against Jermyn in the Mayor's
Court of the City of Carbondale.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court where counsel for
Jermyn, the plaintiff in error, argued: "A bill or order drawn upon a
part of a fund only, will not be considered an assignment unless the
drawer [sic] has assented to. it." " The cases cited included Mandeville
v. Welch and Fairgrieves v. Lehigh Navigation Co. This was the
argument which had found no favor with the court only two years
earlier. However, it seems to have made a different impression this
time. In reversing the judgment below, Justice Mercur, speaking for
a unanimous court, said:
"It is true, where an order is drawn for the whole of a particular fund, it amounts to an equitable assignment of that fund, and
after notice to the drawee, it binds the fund in his hands. Where,
however, the assignment is of a part only of the fund the law seems
to be otherwise. Thus, it was said by Mr. Justice Story, in giving
the opinion of the court in Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277,
'when the order is drawn on a general or particular fund for a part
only, it does not amount to an assignment of that part, or give a
lien as against the drawee unless he consent to the appropriation .by
an acceptance of the draft; or an obligation to accept may be fairly
implied from the custom of trade or the course of business between
the parties, as a part of their contract.' The reasons which he
gives are, that a creditor should not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action into many actions, without the assent of his debtor,
thereby subjecting the latter to embarrassments and responsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. It was held in Gibson v. Clark,3 4 20 Pick. 15, that the assignment of part of a debt
will not bind the debtor, either in equity or at law, nor deprive him
of the right to pay the whole to the assignor, after notice that a part
has been transferred to the assignee. All the decisions relating to
this question of assignment are not in entire harmony. We shall
not now attempt to reconcile them. We, however, are clearly of
the opinion that an assignment like the present one, which professes to transfer a debt to arise for wages not yet earned, against
any person by whom the assignor may thereafter be employed,
although followed by subsequent notice of the assignment to such
an employer, is insufficient, without acceptance, to make a valid
transfer of the debt against the employer." 3'
The last sentence of this quotation seems to base the decision not
on the partial character of the assignment but on the fact that it related
33. Id. at 4O.
34. The correct title of this case is Gibson v. Cooke. See note 6 supra.
35. 75 Pa. 399, 402 (1874).
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to wages to be earned in a future employment.3
Had counsel's partial
assignment argument been passed over in silence, there would be no need
to consider the case at this place; but, while Justice Mercur did not "attempt to reconcile" the decisions on partial assignments, he certainly
indicated that the door was open for a holding that a partial assignment conveys no right against the debtor either at law or in equity.
Apparently, Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co. was completely overlooked,
which is surprising, in view of the fact that it had been so recently decided. Perhaps the oversight is explained by the failure of the defendant in error (the partial assignee) to make an appearance or file a paperbook,3 7 and further by the changed composition of the court. Since the
decision in the Caldwell case, two justices had retired and the membership of the court had been increased from five to seven, with the result
that four new justices had come to the court, including Justice Mercur.
Among the departed was Justice Read, who had written the opinion in
Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co. But whatever the explanation of the conflicting views, the Caldwell and Jermyn decisions have provided a high
source for divergent streams of judicial thought which have flowed
through subsequent Pennsylvania decisions.
Obviously, a decision on whether or not a partial assignment bound
the debtor in equity could be obtained by a bill in equity filed by the partial assignee. It was not long before such suits were instituted against
the City of Philadelphia, the complainants claiming to be partial
assignees of claims against the City. In Phoenix Iron Co. v. City of
Philadelphia,3 Judge Pierce, sitting in the Court of Common Pleas of
36. The opinion has been so interpreted in later decisions.

In Budd v. Himmel-

berger & Smith, 4 Dist. 545, 547 (C. P. Berks 1895) Judge Endlich observed: "As
for Jermyn v. Moffltt, supra, it is true that there is a reference to the observation of
Mr. Justice Story, in Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat (U. S.) 277, to the effect that
an order drawn on a fund for part of it only is not an assignment thereof unless the
drawer consent to the appropriation by acceptance of the order, etc.; the reason being
that a creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many
causes of action without the assent of the debtor. But the real ground of the decision
was that the order, claimed to be an assignment of funds due the drawer in the hands
of the drawee, was an indefinite one upon wages as yet unearned by the drawer in the
hands of the particular company or of any person by whom he should be employed."
See also note 55 infra.
37. This explanation was suggested by Judge Beitler in W. S. Cooper Brass
Works, Inc. v. Nass, 13 Dist. 405, 406 (C. P. Phila. 1904) where he said: "It is somewhat remarkable that in Jermyn v. Moffitt no mention of Caldwell v. Hartupee was
made, but the appellee presented no paper-book, and the order was, as in Fairgrieves v.
Lehigh Navigation Company, an order to pay installments of wages to be earned in the
future."
38. 1I Phila. 203 (Pa. 1876). Murphy contracted to build the South Street Bridge
for the city. The iron company furnished him materials and took a paper executed by
him and addressed to the City Controller, which authorized the latter to deduct from
Murphy's warrants such sums as should be due the complainant company for materials
supplied. The controller received the paper and agreed to withhold and pay over to the
iron company the sums involved. However, the court held that the controller had no
authority to make such an agreement, and consequently the assignment could bind the
city only by virtue of notice and not because it had assented thereto. Who all the
parties defendant were is not stated, but apparently Murphy was one of them.
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Philadelphia, wrote an able and learned opinion in which he viewed the
whole matter in its proper light. He pointed out the distinction between actions at law, "such as Mandeville v. Welch, . . . Fairgrievesv.
The Lehigh Navigation Co. .... and Jermyn v. Moffitt. . ..

All of

which were no doubt rightly decided, but for other reasons than the
partial character of the assignments," and suits in equity, where "there
is in reality but one suit, in which all the parties having an interest, or
in any way liable, are made parties, and the court having full control of
the costs, a decree can be made by which full justice and protection will
be given to all, without vexation or annoyance to the debtor." 31 Demurrers to the bill 40 were overruled, but the court reserved for decision
upon final adjudication the question of whether or not public policy pre41
vented the enforcement of partial assignments against a city.
The question reserved in the Phoenix Iron Company case came
before the Supreme Court in Appeals of the City of Philadelphia,4 2 decided in 1878. The court reversed the decree below and dismissed
the bill on the grounds: "The probable and natural effect of holding
the municipality liable to each [partial] assignee would subject its officers to vexatious annoyances and the city to litigation and costs ...
The policy of the law is against permitting individuals, by their private
contracts, to embarrass the financial officers of a municipality." 4' The
decision was thus placed on public policy applying only to the partial
assignment of a municipal obligation. 44 Justice Mercur, who wrote the
opinion, made this clear in a statement which also took notice of a distinction generally between the situation at law and in equity. He said:
"It is conceded that at law the enforcement of such assignments would
39. Id. at 204.
4o. The ground's of the demurrers were: (i) the assignment, because of its partial
character, was not valid against the city; (2) the controller had no authority from the
city to receive notice of the assignment or to agree to honor it. The court held that
the controller did have authority to receive notice, but not to promise to honor the
assignment.
41. Since this question had not been raised by the demurrers, it was thought improper to consider it.
42. 86 Pa. 179 (1878). The case involved a bill in equity by Quin against the
City, its Treasurer, its Chief Engineer, and Burton. The facts were very similar to
those presented in the Phoenix Iron Company case. Burton had contracted to build a
bridge for the city and had assigned to Quin a portion of the amount due from the
city. The city disregarded the assignment and issued a warrant to Burton for the full
amount due. The bill prayed for an injunction restraining the payment of the warrant and for a decree directing payment of $4,8oo (the amount of the assignment) to

Quin.

43. Id. at 182.
44. The court had held earlier in Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. 211 (1873)
that an assignee, under a total zrssignment, might recover against the city in action of
debt brought in the name of the assignor to the use of the assignee. The city, having
notice of the assignment, had refused to honor it and had issued warrants to the
assignor. The case was distinguished in Philadelphia'sAppeals as involving a total
assignment. Said the court: "While we adhere to the doctrine of Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, supra, yet we are unwilling to carry the rule to the extent asked for here, even
in equity." 86 Pa. 179, 182 (1878).
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be questionable:

Jermyn v. Moffitt . . .; Mandeville v. Welch . . .;

yet it is claimed that they are good in equity and therefore this assignment may be enforced here. There is no doubt that as between individuals this rule prevails in equity. Whether it shall so be held against a
municipal corporation is now the question." 4' This seems to be perfectly clear recognition that as against a private debtor, a partial assignment could be enforced in equity, and until very recent years 46 all the
Pennsylvania decisions indicated that the rule of PhiladelphiaAppeals
47
applied only in the case of municipal obligations.
The opinion in Philadelphia'sAppeals contains no reference to
Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co. 48 and, for all that appears, Justice Mercur
was still unfamiliar with that decision. It was about a year later, when
45. Ibid. Justice Mercur's reference to Jermyn v. Moffitt, 75 Pa. 399 (1874) is
particularly interesting, since he also wrote the opinion in that case. Did he mean to
imply that the Jermyn decision was limited to actions at law?
46. See the discussion of Gordon v. Hartford Sterling Co. at p. 35 infra.
47. In Geist's Appeal, io4 Pa. 351 (1883) the doctrine of Philadelphia's Appeals,
86 Pa. 179 (878) was applied and extended to a controversy between the partial
assignee and the assignor's creditors. Again, the matter involved a bridge construction contract, this time with the City of Pittsburgh. The issue was that of priority as
between the partial assignees and the assignee under a general assignment for benefit
of creditors made by the assignor. The court held that since the partial assignments
could not be enforced against the city under the rule of Philadelphia'sAppeals, the general assignee acted properly in collecting the claim from the city and paying the proceeds to the general creditors of the assignor. According to the court, the assignor
could have collected the claim against the city and paid his general creditors. Consequently, the general assignee could do likewise without making himself or the assigned
estate liable to the partial assignees. This ignores the fact that a partial assignment is
enforcible against the assignor, regardless of whether it is enforcible against the
debtor or not. See note 13 supra. But, however this may be, the case involved the
partial assignment of a municipal obligation and did not extend the rule of Philadelphia's Appeals to a private debtor.
The next case to reach the Supreme Court was Vetter v. Meadville, 236 Pa. 563,
85 Atl. I9 (1912). This was an action of case in the name of Vetter, a streetpaving
contractor, to the use of the Pittsburgh & Buffalo Coal Company, the partial assignee,
against the City of Meadville. The court held that the statement of claim disclosed no
cause for action, for "where the assignment is only of a part of the fund more than
notice is required, the assent of the city must be averred and shown." Id. at 569, 85
Atl. at 20.
Cf. Wells v. Philadelphia, 270 Pa. 42, 112 At. 867 (1921) where the use-plaintiff
was permitted to recover, not as a partial assignee, but by subrogation under the terms
of a construction contract and bond.
Lower Pennsylvania courts have followed these decisions in cases involving municipal obligations. Cobleigh v. Borough of Courtdale, 37 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 122
(C. P. Luz. 1943) ; Penn Iron Co. v. City of Lancaster, 14 Lan. L. Rev. 177 (C. P.
Lan. 1897). But when the matter was the subject of judicial observation, it has been
pointed out that Philadelphia'sAppeals and its progeny have no application in suits
against private debtors. W. S. Cooper Brass Works, Inc. v. Nass, 13 Dist. 405 (C. P.
Phila. I9O4); Budd v. Himmelberger & Smith, 4 Dist. 545 (C. P. Berks 1895). In
the latter case it was stated: "For obvious reasons, it had been held in Philadelphia's
Appeals . . . that a partial assignment of a contract between an individual and a
municipality was not binding upon the latter, and that was followed in Geist's Appeal
• . .;so that, whilst the same may, to that extent, discredit the case of Phoenix Iron
Co. v. Philadelphia . . ., it does not establish the doctrine that, as between individuals, there can be no such partial assignments." Id. at 547. This interpretation of
Pennsylvania law has been accepted by authorities outside the state. James v. City of
Newton, i42 Mass. 366, 378, 8 N. E. 122, 127 (1886) ; Note (1932) 8o A. L. R. 413, 426.
48. 7o Pa. 74 (1871).
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the court decided East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh,49
that the Caldwell decision received its first reported recognition. This
was the second case arising upon a bill in equity in which the court had
occasion to refer to the partial assignment question. A firm, trading as
James S.. Marsh, were manufacturers of agricultural implements and
Dunkel was their general agent. Marsh executed a written direction
to Dunkel to pay over to the East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co.
$1350 from the proceeds of reapers sold by Dunkel within three months
from the date of the order. Dunkel agreed to pay the lumber company
as directed. Thereafter the Marsh firm became insolvent and made
an assignment for benefit of creditors. Dunkel made sales of reapers
in excess of $135o and turned the proceeds over to Marsh and the
assignees for benefit of creditors. The lumber company then filed a bill
against Marsh, Dunkel, and the assignees for discovery of the amount
of the sales and for an accounting. The main issue of the case was
presented by the lower court's holding that the order on Dunkel was not
an effective assignment because it involved claims (proceeds of reapers
not yet sold) not in existence at the time it was given. The Supreme
Court did not accept this view " and granted plaintiff the relief prayed
for. The reference to the Caldwell case is contained in the following
bief paragraph in Justice Trunkey's opinion:
"Anything which shows an intent to assign on one side, and to
receive on the other, will operate as an assignment. .

.

.

A draft

on a particular fund in the hands of an attorney for collection is an
equitable assignment of it. .

.

.

So is an order for part of the

proceeds of a note, though not accepted by the trustee for collecting the note:

Caldwell v. Hartupee. . . . " 51

This reference to the Caldwell case was dictum, since in the case before
the court Dunkel had assented to the order, but perhaps it implied doubt
as to whether or not the Caldwell decision was limited to orders on persons acting as agents or trustees for collection. 2
Three weeks later, in delivering the opinion of the court in Ruple v.
Bindleyf Justice Trunkey again considered the Caldwell case by way of
dictum. The order before the court was in effect a total assignment,
49. 91 Pa. 96 (1879).
50. This aspect of the case is discussed in note 90 infra.

51. gi Pa. 96, ioo (1879).

52. If the debtor against whom the partial assignee seeks to enforce the assignment is acting as collection agent or trustee for the assignor, he may be under an implied or express obligation to honor the various orders of the assignor. If this be true,
he is really not in the position of a nonassenting debtor. See Dunbar v. Mercer, 128
Pa. Super. 138, 142, 193 At. 479, 481 (937), aff'd on the opinion below, 330 Pa. 96,
198 Atl. 617 (1938). Subsequent cases have not interpreted the Caldwell decision as
resting on this basis. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. I944) tit. 69, § 561, dealing
with assignment of accounts receivable.
53. gi Pa. 296 (1879).
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but, referring to a New York decision holding that partial assignments
"are good and will be enforced in equity," he stated: "Whether such
assignments are valid in Pennsylvania need not now be said; for the
order covered the whole [debt]

....

54

But, in the following para-

graph of the opinion appears this statement: "In Caldwell v. Hartupee
& Co. an order for part of a fund was held to be a valid equitable assignment."
The question of the effect of a partial assignment of a private debt,
as distinguished from a municipal obligation, was not to come before
the Supreme Court again until 1935, fifty-five years after Justice
Trunkey had said whether or not such assignments were valid in
Pennsylvania need not yet be decided. Unfortunately for the lower
court judges, they were not in Justice Trunkey's position during this
interval; they had to make decisions and it is not surprising that they
had difficulty in formulating the law to be applied.55 The decisions left
54. Id. at 299.
55. It appears that the nisi prius courts generally followed the lead of the Caldwell
case and regarded partial assignments as effective. It will be recalled that this was
the view taken in Phoenix Iron Co. v. City of Philadelphia, ii Phila. 203 (Pa. 1876)
(discussed in note 38 supra) and in accord were the only other cases in which the
lower courts gave specific attention to the problem. Diamond Textile Machine Works,
Inc. v. International Batting Mills, 7 D. & C. i13 (C. P. Phila. 1925); W. S. Cooper
Brass Works, Inc. v. Nass, 13 Dist. 4o5 (C. P. Phila. 1904) ; Budd v. Himmelberger

& Smith, 4 Dist. 545 (C. P. Berks 1895). A number of cases apparently involved
partial assignments, but left the question unnoticed or went off on other grounds. McManaman v. Hanover Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 18I (C. P. Luz. 189o) ;
Evans v. Kingston Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 351 (C. P. Luz. I89o) ;
Trumbower v. Ivey & Rapp, 2 County Ct. 470 (C. P. Bucks 1886) ; Strausser v. Taylor & Co., 2 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 214 (C. P. Schuylkill I88i).
The facts in the Cooper Brass Works case, supra, are worthy of notice. Auchter
contracted to make alteration, in a church building, made a partial assignment of the
proceeds to the Brass Works and then became insolvent, Nass being appointed his
trustee in bankruptcy. Both the Brass Works and Nass claimed the amount of the
assignment from the church and by order of court joined in an interpleader, framed a
case stated, and stipulated that if the legal effect of the assignment was to create an
indebtedness by the church to the Brass Works, then the latter was entitled to payment
from the church; otherwise, Nass was entitled to the full amount owing by the church.
Judge Beitler held that Auchter had executed a valid equitable assignment and gave
judgment for plaintiff, saying: "There can be no question that orders such as were
passed on in Fairgrieves v. Lehigh Navigation Co., 2 Phila. 182, McCaffrey v. Cassidy, 3 Phila. 21o, and Jermyn v. Moffitt, 75 Pa. 399, drawn for a part of a fund and
not accepted by the party on whom drawn, do not constitute, at law, an assignment.
The case before us is ruled by Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co., to use, 70 Pa. 74;
Moeser v. Schneider, 158 Pa. 412; Beaumont v. Lane, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 73; and
Oakes v. Oram, 43 Legal Intell. 520." 13 Dist. 405-6 (C. P. Phila. 1904). In the
Budd case, supra, Judge Endlich, after discussing Caldwell v. Hartupee & Co., 70 Pa.
74 (i87I), East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96 (879), and
Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. 296 (1879), as well as Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277
(U. S. 1820), said: "I take it, therefore, to be the law of this state that an order delivered by one party to another for present and unconditional payment to the latter of
money belonging to the drawer in the hands of a third private party, whether it be of
the whole or only a part thereof, constitutes a present equitable assignment to the payee
of so much of the fund as the order calls for, if and only if the fund out of which payment is to be made is clearly identified." 4 Dist. 548 (C. P. Berks 1895). (Italics
supplied.)
The decisions of the Superior Court were less conclusive, the court not feeling under obligation to decide the question in the cases before it. Trexler v. Kuntz, 36 Pa.
Super. 352 (19o8) ; Botsford v. Lull, 30 Pa. Super.

292

(19o6) ; Beaumont Bros. v.

34
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no doubt that the partial assignee of a municipal obligation could not
recover against the nonassenting debtor either at law or in equity 56 and
it followed without question that in such a case the debtor was free,
regardless of notice, to obtain a discharge by payment in full to the
assignor. But in the case of a private obligation, few of the major
issues had been settled. It was reasonably clear that the partial assignee
could not recover against the nonassenting debtor in an action at law,
when such recovery would leave the debtor obligated to the assignor
for the unassigned portion of the claim. But beyond this there was
little sure ground to build upon. Could the partial assignee recover in
a proceeding in equity or at law to which the assignor was a party?
The Caldwell case looked one way, the Jermyn case the other, with subsequent decisions indicating that the issue had not been decided. Could
the debtor with notice disregard the claim of the partial assignee and
obtain a discharge by paying the assignor? Judge Hare had answered
with a resounding yes, but did his answer stand if the Caldwell decision
was taken at its face value?
Of the various lower court cases which considered these questions,
there is one which particularly deserves attention. It is Diamond Textile Machine Works, Inc. v. International-Batting Mills," decided in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia in 1925. Plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement whereby defendant agreed to pay
plaintiff certain commissions for selling machinery owned by the defendant. Plaintiff made an arrangement with one Mellman to share the
commissions in return for Mellman's services in finding a purchaser.
Defendant received notice of this arrangement but did not agree to pay
any part of the commissions to Mellman. The sale having been made,
plaintiff brought suit for the commissions and defendant denied liability
on the ground that the commissions were not payable to plaintiff alone,
but jointly to plaintiff and Mellman. The case came on for hearing
before Judge Taulane on rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
The court held that the arrangement between plaintiff and Mellman
amounted to an assignment of one-half of the commissions to the latter.
However, this did not make Mellman a party to the contract with defendant and give defendant the right to insist that the suit be brought
in the joint names of plaintiff and Mellman. "The question for deciLane, 3 Pa. Super. 73 (1896). The following statement from the opinion in the Botsford case is typical: "'We are not convinced that it has been conclusively settled in this
state that the legal plaintiffs can split up the consideration under such a contract, and
assign portions of it to different persons so that they can sue and collect in the name
of the legal plaintiffs to their use. But the view we take of this case renders it unnecessary to conclusively determine this question." 3o Pa. Super. 292, 295 (19o6).
56. See note 47 supra.
57. 7 D. & C. 113 (C. P. Phila. 1925).
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sion," said Judge Taulane, "is whether the defendant is obliged to protect the interest of A. J. Mellman, a partial assignee, because if a debtor
is under no such duty the rights of A. J. Mellman are no concern of the
defendant and he should be obliged to pay the commissions in full to the
plaintiff. No one would question that such is a debtor's duty if the
assignment, instead of being partial, embraced the whole debt." 58
After quoting from Mandeville v. Welch' 9 and Judge Hare's statement
in the Fairgrievescase to the effect that a partial assignment will not
deprive the debtor of the right to make full payment to the assignor,60
Judge Taulane concluded: "There is no justification, either in principle or convenience, for any such distinction *between partial and complete assignments." 61 "The courts of this State," he said, "have recognized and enforced partial assignments" 62 and "as partial assignments
are good in equity, and equity is part of our law, . .

.

they can be

enforced through common law remedies." 63 This was accomplished
by entering judgment against defendant for the commissions in full and
staying execution for fifteen days with leave to the defendant to petition
to pay into court one-half of the commissions and to frame an issue between plaintiff and Mellman as to which party was entitled thereto.
Thus, the judicial pendulum had swung from the Fairgrievescase,
through the Caldwell case, relied upon by Judge Taulane, to the greatest
protection of the partial assignee in the case of Diamond Textile Machine Works. But if members of the bar assumed that the Supreme
Court would give its approval to any such development of the law when
after long silence it again spoke, they were destined for a rude shock.
There came to the court in 1935 the case of Gordon v. Hartford
Sterling Co.,6 4 which arose on petition by the receiver of Hartford Sterl-

ing Co. for leave to compromise suits. The Sterling Company's plant
had been destroyed by fire and the company claimed a loss of $73,000,
for which it asserted it was entitled to recover from the insurer. There
is more than a suggestion that the claim was fraudulently padded and
58. Id. at 114.
5!.5 Wheat. 277 (U. S. 1820).

6o. "From this rule [against splitting up a single cause of action] some early
Philadelphia cases (Fairgrieves v. Lehigh Navigation Co., 2 Phila. 182; McCaffrey v.
Cassidy, 3 Phila. 2io, and Miller v. Insurance Co., 5 Phila. 12), and some rather
recent cases elsewhere (Thiel v. John Week Lumber Co., 137 Wis. 272, and Gilman v.
Raymond, 235 Mass. 284) have deduced the further rule that a debtor may ignore
notice of a partial assignment and pay his creditor in full." 7 D. & C. 113, 114 (C. P.

Phila. 1925).

6I. Ibid.
62. As authority for this statement judge Taulane cited: Phoenix Iron Co. v.
Philadelphia, ii Phila. 203 (Pa. 1876) discussed in note 38 supra; W. S. Cooper
Brass Works, Inc. v. Nass, 13 Dist. 405 (C. P. Phila. 1904) discussed in note 55

supra; Beaumont v. Lane, 3 Pa. Super. 73 (1896) ; Oakes v. Oram, 43 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 520 (Pa. 1867).
63. 7 D. & C. 113, ti15(C. P.. Phila. 1925) citing, inter alia, Caldwell v. Hartupee
& Co., 70 Pa. 74 (1871).
64. 319 Pa. 174, 179 Atl.

234

(1935).
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the company's president set the fire. The company contracted with
Lofland to restore the plant and, as security for payment, assigned the
contractor $26,700 of the claim against the insurance company. The
insurer contested its liability and two suits were brought against it, 5
one by the Sterling Company as the insured and Lofland as assignee,
and the other by the Sterling Company, Lofland, and certain mortgagees
claiming under a mortgage clause of one of the insurance policies.
Thereafter, a judgment creditor 66 of the Sterling Company obtained
the appointment of a receiver for the company and the receiver petitioned the court below 67 for authority to compromise the suits against
the insurance company for $36,ooo. Lofland and other creditors 1s of
the Sterling Company objected to the proposed compromise. The
lower court approved the receiver's petition. On appeal, Lofland contended that the order approving the compromise over his objection
impaired the obligation of his contract, since he was an assignee of part
of the compromised claim under an assignment made prior to the appointment of the receiver. Because Lofland raised this question for the
first time in the Supreme Court, that court refused to consider it unless
the error of the lower court was "basis and fundamental."
As to the issue thus presented Justice Kephart said:
"We do not consider the question now raised as basic or
fundamental for the following reasons: The assignment was for
a part of the claim recoverable under the insurance policies. It was
a partial assignment. We have early held that partial assignments
are not binding unless they have been assented to by the debtor
. . . [citing Jermyn v. Moffitt, Philadelphia'sAppeal, Geist's Appeal, Vetter v. Meadville, and Wells v. Philadelphia];the reason
advanced is that a creditor should not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action into many without the assent of the debtor;
to do so subjects the debtor to embarrassments, responsibilities and
multiplicity of suits not contemplated in his original undertaking.
It was held in Jermyn v. Moffitt, supra, that the assignment of part
of a debt will not bind the debtor, either in equity or at law, nor deprive him of the right to pay the whole to the assignor, even after
notice that a part had been transferred to the assignee. .

.

. There-

fore, where an assignor assigns a part of his claim, he is still the
principal creditor and retains control of the claim unless the debtor
65. The suits were brought in the federal court: one for $53,757.17 with interest by

the Sterling Company and Lofland as plaintiffs; the other for $2I,941.7o by the Sterling Company to the use of itself, the mortgagees named in the mortgage clause of the
policy, and Lofland.
66. Lansdowne Bank & Trust Company, which later went into the hands of the
state liquidator and is therefore represented in the case by William D. Gordon, Secretary of Banking, as receiver.
67. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, sitting in equity.

68. Opposing the compromise were: Lofland, asserting a secured claim of $27,2oo,
an insurance adjuster claiming 5% of the recovery, and three other unsecured creditors asserting claims totaling $8,5oo. These parties were the appellants before the
Supreme Court.
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accepts the assignee as a new creditor to the amount of the assignment. In the instant case there is no evidence that the insurance
company assented to the assignments." 69
Language could not more categorically deny that the partial
assignee has any interest, legal or equitable, which can be enforced
against a nonassenting debtor. Later in the opinion, Justice Kephart
repeats the proposition by saying that Lofland, as partial assignee, "had
no lien on the fund and his assignment did not bind the fund in any respect," for: "To fasten a lien on the fund where the assignment is only
of a part of it, the assent of a debtor must be averred and proven." 70 If
these statements are taken at their face value, and apparently they have
been as evidenced by dicta in subsequent Supreme and Superior Court
decisions, 71 they go beyond anything previously decided. Also, the
Caldwell case 72 and the cases which have followed it,"' such as the
Diamond Textile Machine Works case,7 4 all are repudiated without
even the honor of recognition."
69. 319 Pa. 174, 177-8, I79 Atl. 234, 236 (1935).

7o. Id. at I79, 179 Ati. at 236.
71. Concrete Form Co., Inc. v. W. T. Grange Construction Co., 320 Pa. 2o5, ISI
Atl. 589 (1935). The case involved the partial assignment of a claim due on a construction contract. After notice of the assignment, the debtor had settled by paying the
assignor. Since the assignor became insolvent, the partial assignee sued the debtor.
In holding for the defendant, the court said: "Defendant cannot be held liable to the
bank [assignee] unless it consented to the subcontractor's assignment, irrespective of
whether the assignment was total or partial. In the case of a partial assignment we
have repeatedly held that notice alone is not enough and that the debtor is not bound
thereby unless he gives his consent." Id. at 208, i8i Atl. at 59o. The only authority
given for this statement is the Sterling Company case "and cases therein cited." However, the Concrete Form Company decision was rested upon the completely adequate
ground that the contract out of which the assigned claim arose contained a provision
prohibiting assignment. It is well settled that such a provision prevents effective
assignment, regardless of the view otherwise taken of partial assignments. RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 151 (c), cited by the court; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs (rev.
ed. 1936) § 422; Grismore, Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract (933)
31 MIcH. L. REv. 299. But the law review commentators who have noticed the Sterling Company and Cotcrete Form Company cases have regarded them as placing
Pennsylvania with the very few states which take the view that a partial assignment
is not effective against the debtor either at law or in equity. See the comments on the
Sterling Company case in (1936) 2 U. OF PiTr. L. REv. III, and on the Concrete Form
Company case in (1936) 34 Mica. L. REv. 1037. The last reference to the problem
has come from the Superior Court in Dunbar v. Mercer, 128 Pa. Super. 138, 142, 193
Atl. 479, 481 (r937), aff'd on the opinion below, 330 Pa. 96, 198 Atl. 617 (1938), where
it was said: "It is well settled that in the case of a partial assignment the debtor is
that principle has no
not bound thereby unless he gives his consent but, as we see it,
application here." Only the Sterling Company and Concrete Form Company cases were
cited. The principle was not applicable because the debtor was acting as a collection
agent who took the proceeds subject to the arrangement which was claimed to be a partial
assignment.
72. 70 Pa. 74 (1871).
73. East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg.Co.v.Marsh, 91 Pa.96 (1879) and the cases
cited innote 55 supra.
74. 7 D. & C.113 (C. P.Phila. 1925).
75. This may not be surprising inview of what isdisclosed by the paper-books
filed inthe Sterling Company case. Inthe court below no issue was made of the validity of the assignment. Lofland took an active part inthe proceedings for the appointment of the receiver and concerning the compromise of the suits, thus submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He claimed that ifthe compromise were approved
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None of the authorities cited by the court sustain such an extreme
position. Jermyn v. Moffitt 76 has been referred to and it will be recalled that the court refused "to reconcile" the cases on the effect of a
partial assignment and finally based its decision on the fact that the
assignment in that case related to wages from an employment not yet
entered into at the time of the assignment.7 1 Philadelphia'sAppeals7
concerned the partial assignment of a municipal obligation and, while
the opinion contained language very similar to that used by Justice
Kephart, Justice Mercur, in deciding the case, made it clear that his decision did not apply in the case of a private, as distinguished from a public
debtor. Geist's Appeal, Vetter v. Meadville, and Wells v. Philadelphia
all involved municipal obligations, followed Philadelphia'sAppeals, and
consequently cannot be regarded as authorities applicable to partial
assignments generally. 79 What Justice Kephart appears to have done
in the Sterling Company case was to extend the rule of the municipal
obligation cases to all partial assignments without being aware that he
was making new law. 80
Such an extreme result should not be approved without careful consideration of the consequences. What justification' could there be for
holding that a partial assignee may not enforce his claim by a bill in
equity against a private debtor and the assignor? The debtor could
obtain complete discharge of his obligation by payment into court, thus
avoiding any of the burdens of "splitting" his obligation. If such a proceeding is brought, or if an action at law is begun against the debtor by
the assignor and assignee jointly, why should the debtor be free to
jeopardize or destroy the assignee's asserted interest by single settlement
he would not be paid in full, but the facts are not clear as to this. The lower court
held that the proceeds of the policy should be paid first to the mortgagee, then to
Lofland, and finally to the unsecured creditors. What the mortgagees were entitled
to was not settled; they had foreclosed on their mortgage and taken over the plant.
Counsel for appellee took the position: "Appellee recognizes that Clayton Lofland had
some rights in the matter under the assignment and contends that his rights were
amply protected." Brief for Appellee, p. x2, 3i9 Pa. 174, 179 Atl. 234 (1935). The

lower court stated: "The Lofland claim is for $27,2oo. and whatever amount may be
found to be due is secured to him by the assignment." Record, p. 5Ia. Counsel for
appellee consequently contended: "We therefore, have a finding that the rights of
Clayton Lofland will not be injured or jeopardized by this settlement." Id. at p. 13.
The only discussion of the partial assignment point is the following: "It is quite obvious
that Clayton Lofland alone cannot maintain a suit against the insurance company because it is merely a partial assignment (page I9a, par. 14), and since there is
no evidence that the insurance company assented to the assignment no suit could be
maintained." Id. at pp. 14-5. The only authority cited for this is Vetter v. Meadville, 236 Pa. 563, 85 Atl. ig (1912). None of the other partial assignment cases
were referred to in any of the briefs.
76. 75 Pa. 399 (1874).
77. See p. 28 supra, and cases cited in note 36 supra.
78. 86 Pa. 179 (1878).
79. For citations and discussion of this point, see note 47 supra.
8o. Also, it should be noted that the lower court's order, which was affirmed, gave
some effect to the partial assignment. Lofland was given priority over the unsecured
creditors of the Sterling Company. See note 75 supra.
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with the assignor? S' Before the institution of proceedings there is
much to be said for the debtor's privilege to obtain discharge by single
settlement with the assignor, for otherwise he must assume the burden
either of separate settlements or of going to court. However, this is
no longer true, once the other parties have taken the matter to court.
These questions will be discussed more fully in the last part of this
article.
The new procedural rules, adopted since the decision of the Sterling
Company case, have some bearing on this problem. Rule 2002 (a) 82
adopts a provision which has long been a part of code procedure in many
states. With certain exceptions not here important, it provides: "all
actions shall be prosecuted by and in the name of the real party in interest." If a partial assignment does not bind the nonassenting debtor
either at law or in equity, it is difficult to see how the partial assignee
is a real party in interest to any extent in an action against the debtor,
for it is generally agreed that the real-party-in-interest rule is entirely
procedural in character and does not give a cause of action to a party
who had none before.8 3 However, the leading commentators on the
Pennsylvania rules have interpreted Rule 2002 (a) as requiring the
partial assignor and assignee to join in any action against the debtor.
Their reasoning is pertinent here: "While the partial assignee does not
have a claim which was recognized at early common law, he is the beneficial owner of part of the original cause of action. As to that part, he,
and he alone should have the right to grant a discharge or control an
action." 84 This is directly contrary to the views expressed by Justice
Kephart in the Sterling Company case.
This discussion of the past and present Pennsylvania law of partial
assignment will not be prolonged. It is the present writer's opinion
that the subject should be thoroughly reconsidered de novo in the light
of present conditions and the law in other jurisdictions, which has
Si. See Diamond Textile Machine Works, Inc. v. International Batting Mills, 7
D. & C. I13 (C. P. Phila. 1925), and discussion at p. 53 infra.
82. 332 Pa. lxxiii (1938).
83. GOODRICH AND AmRAm, PENNSYLVANIA

PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE (940)

§§2002 (a)-2 and 2002 (a)-3; Note (940) 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 220; CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 96-i06; Simes, The Real'Partyin Interest (1922) io Ky. L. J. 6o.
See also Cable v. St. Louis Marine Ry. & Dock Co., 21 Mo. 133 (855).

84.

§

GOODRICH AND AmRAm,

PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE (1940)

The other new rules bearing on the problem are those relating to
interpleader. Rules 2301-2325, 335 Pa. xxxiv (939).
After commencement of an
action, the court, of its own motion or upon petition of defendant, may interplead the
plaintiff and any claimant not a party of record. Rule 23o2. But it is doubtful that a
partial assignee may be interpleaded if the Sterling Company case is law, for to sus2002

(a) -IO.

tain interpleader the defendant must show risk of double liability on his part. Rule
2303 (a) (i). Interestingly enough, the annotations to the rules, in connection with
this problem, make reference to the Diamond Textile Machine Works case without
any indication that it has been overruled. 335 Pa. xxxv (939).
It should be noted
that the above interpleader rules relate only to interpleader after the commencement
of the action; equitable interpleader is preserved. Rule 2318.
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greatly developed since the decision of most of the cases discussed above.
However, this is only one phase of the wage assignment problem, and
before considering the possible Pennsylvania law of the future we should
give some attention to the Pennsylvania decisions on the other phase
of the problem-the assignability of unearned wages.
III
In the Fairgrieves case,"5 Judge Hare thought that wages to be
earned in the future from an existing employment did not constitute a
sufficiently present interest to be assignable at law, and to enforce an
assignment in equity would burden the employee's earning power contrary to public policy. In enunciating this view, he expressly refused
to make any distinction between wages to be earned in an existing employment (which was the case before him) and those to be earned in
future employments.8 0
This question first came before the Supreme Court in Jermyn v.
Moffltt,8 7 which, insofar as it involved the partial assignment point, has

been discussed above."" It will be recalled that the assignment purported to cover wages to become due in the future from any person
by whom the employee might be employed, and, in fact, the defendant
Jermyn had not employed the assignor until after the execution of the
assignment. On its facts, then, the case involved the assignability of
wages earned in an employment contracted after the assignment and
the court rested its decision on this basis, being of the opinion "that an
assignment like the present 'one, which professes to transfer a debt to
arise for wages not yet earned, against any person by whom the assignor
may thereafter be employed, although followed by a subsequent notice of
the assignment to such an employer, is insufficient, without acceptance,
to make a valid transfer of the debt against the employer." 89
85. 2 Phila. 182 (Pa. 1856).

86. "It is true, that the transfer now in question is limited to what might be earned
in the service of a particular master; but, if equity will sustain and enforce such transactions in any case, it must be prepared to do it in all." Id. at 185. This is the distinction which has been made in other jurisdictions. See note 153 infra.
87. 75 Pa. 399 (1874).
88. See p. 27 et seq. supra.
89. 75 Pa. 399, 402 (1874). (Italics supplied.) In the court below, one of the
points made by Jermyn was: "An assignment can only be made of moneys due or
owing, and not in futuro of moneys to be earned." Id. at 40o. The lower court rejected this view and replied, inter alia: "A party is competent to assign wages to come
due if the vested rights of third parties are in nowise prejudiced thereby, and we answer defendant's first point in the negative." Ibid. The supreme court held that the
lower court committed no error as to this point, saying: "In some cases a valid assignment may be made of moneys thereafter to be made, or of grain thereafter to be
grown. . . . If counsel desire an answer applicable to the evidence in the case being

tried, they should so indicate it in their point submitted." Id. at 4oi. This statement

certainly carries the implication that future wages from existing employment may be
assigned without violation of public policy.
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There is nothing in the facts or the reasoning of the court in the
Jermyn case to justify the conclusion that the decision supported Judge
Hare's broad denunciation of all unearned wage assignments as being
in violation of public policy. Furthermore, the early cases o0 do not so
interpret the decision. Of these, Ruple v. Bindley 9 ' should be mentioned. Ruple agreed to build a flight of stairs for Bindley and, before
he performed the contract, made a total assignment of the proceeds.
Notice was given to Bindley, who later settled with Ruple. An action
of assumpsit was brought in Ruple's name to the use of the assignee.
The Supreme Court held that the assignment should be given effect,
regardless of the fact that the stairs were not constructed until after the
assignment. No issue of public policy is mentioned in the opinion,
although the interest assigned was apparently Ruple's compensation as
a carpenter to be earned after the assignment.9 2 The Jerntyn decision
was limited to its particular facts, i. e. the assignment of wages from
future employment. 3 Thus, by the early 188o's (the Ruple case had
been decided in 1879) there was every indication that the law of Pennsylvania would develop along the lines followed in other jurisdictions,94
and the assignment of future wages from existing employment would
not in any way be regarded as contrary to public policy, although it is
go. The first cases discussing the Jermyn decision involved the assignment of
money to be earned from construction and sales contracts, rather than employment contracts, but the broad position indicated is that any money to be earned from an existing contract may be assigned. In Phoenix Iron Company v. City of Philadelphia, ii
Phila. 2o3 (Pa. 1876), Judge Pierce, of the Philadelphia Common Pleas, rejected the
argument that proceeds from a bridge construction contract were not assignable, because at the time of the assignment the assignor had not yet performed the contract.
He said: "By a reference to the authorities it will be perceived that not only present
but expectant interests may'be assigned in equity, such as money thereafter to be made;
the earnings of a railway company; grain thereafter to be grown. .
A fortiori
money to become, due upon a contract already made and existing at the" time of the
assignment would seem to be within the rule." Id. at 208. One of the authorities
cited is Jermyn v. Moffitt. In East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, gi Pa.
96 (1879) the Supreme Court held effective in equity an assignment of proceeds from
sales of agricultural implements to be made within three months from the date of the
assignment. The Jermyn case was not cited, but the court discussed with approval the
leading case of Mulhall v. Quinn, 67 Mass. 1O5 (1854), in which the Massachusetts
court pointed out that future wages from existing employment are assignable.
91. 91 Pa. 296 (1879).
92. Relying heavily upon East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, gi Pa.
96 (1879), Justice Trunkey said: "An assignment, for a valuable consideration, of
demands having at the time no actual existence, but which rest in expectancy only, is
valid in equity as an agreement, and takes effect as an assignment, when the demands
intended to be assigned are subsequently brought into existence." 91 Pa. 296, 299

(1879).

93. "The defendant seems to rely on Jermyn v. Moffitt . . . where it is held
that a transfer of 'a debt to arise for wages not yet earned, against any person by whom
the assignor may afterwards be employed, although followed by a subsequent notice
of the assignment to such an employer, is insufficient, without acceptance, to make a
valid transfer of the debt against the employer.' The soundness of this principle is
unquestioned, and was strictly applicable to the facts of the case. Jermyn's name was
not on the instrument; Leslie, the assignor, had no contract with him, was not then
in his employ, and, consequently, there was neither a present nor expectant fund on
which the assignment could attach." Id. at 300.
94. See note 153 infra.
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true Judge Hare's decision in the Fairgrieves case had not specifically
been repudiated.95
That the course of judicial decision was not to remain this placid
was soon shown by what happened in Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Woodring.9 6 It appears that on September 7, 1885, Woodring executed a
"power of attorney," which purported to grant Eliza McDermott the
following authority: " . . to receive, collect, sue for, and receipt for
all wages or moneys due, or that may hereafter become due me from
..................
, and I do hereby authorize and empower the said
Eliza McDermott to fill up this power of attorney with the name of any
person, firm or corporation for whom I may be working at any time during the time I am receiving groceries and provisions as aforesaid from
the said store of the said Eliza McDermott; . . . and I hereby declaring
that this power of attorney is, for the considerations above mentioned,
by me irrevocable." 97 Thereafter, Woodring became employed by the
Lehigh Valley Railroad and was so employed during the months of September and October, i886. Eliza McDermott supplied groceries as
contemplated, and on October 6 or 7, 1886, notified the railroad of the
power and stated she would look to the company for Woodring's wages.
On October 8, i886, Woodring notified the company that he claimed
all of his wages and no other person had any legal right to them. Thereafter, the railroad paid some of the wages to Eliza McDermott and
Woodring brought suit against the company to recover them.
The case came before the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton
County, where judgment was given for the plaintiff. The opinion of
95. One of the most interesting lower court decisions.of this period which took

such a view was Trumbower v. Ivey & Rapp, 2 County Ct. 470 (C. P. Bucks 1886).
The case involved conflicting claims under wage assignments given two different assignees. While Trumbower was employed by the firm of Rapp & Applebach, he made
an assignment to a storekeeper, Laubach, of wages to become due from the firm or
"any other party employing me." Applebach sold out his interest in the firm of Rapp
& Applebach and the new firm of Ivey & Rapp was formed to carry on the business.
A short time before this change, Trumbower left the employ of the old firm and after
the reorganization was employed by the new one. Trumbower then made other wage
assignments to another storekeeper, Bachman. Both assignees notified Ivey & Rapp
of the assignments, Laubach's notice being first. In holding that Bachman had priority
over Laubach as to wages earned by Trumbower in the employ of the new firm, the
court took the view that the existence of the employment at the time of the assignment was the determining factor. Since Trumbower's engagement by Ivey & Rapp
was regarded as a new employment, taking place after the assignment to Laubach,
that assignment was held ineffective under the Jermj3r case. On the other hand,
Bachman's assignment was regarded as effective because given after the new employment. The fact that the wages involved were unearned at the time of Bachman's
assignment was held immaterial, the court saying: "But where there is a present engagement for work of a subsisting employment, it appears that the wages to become
due, through such employment, from the employer named in the assignment may be
transferred, and, where notice is proved, will be enforced in equity." Id. at 471. Cf.
Strausser v. Taylor & Co., 2 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 214 (C. P. Schuylkill
i881) (a partial wage assignment was enforced against an employer who had assented
to it). The fact of the employer's assent was regarded as distinguishing the Jermnyn
case.
96. ii6 Pa. 513, 9 Atl. 58 (1887).
97. Id. at 514, 9 AtI. at 58.
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the lower court is printed in full in the Supreme Court Reports and, in
view of the later per curiam approval of the higher court, the views of
Judge Schuyler merit careful consideration. He advanced two reasons
for his conclusion that the power of attorney was ineffective as an
assignment of Woodring's wages earned in the employ of the railroad.
The first reason was simply an application of Jermyn v. Moffitt.98
Woodring was not an employee of the railroad at the time he executed
the power, and the legal inference was that the railroad had never
accepted his order, since the jury had made no finding of such acceptance.9 9 Hence, under the Jermyn decision the power of attorney could
not be held a valid assignment. Apparently not willing to rest his decision upon the inference of nonacceptance by the railroad, Judge
Schuyler gave as his second reason what amounted to a vigorous revival of Judge Hare's public policy argument. "But aside from these
authorities [Jermyn v. Moffitt, Ruple v. Bindley, and others],100 and

aside from the question of acceptance," he said, "we think all assignments such as the one in controversy here, should be declared void as
being against the principles of public policy. The present assignment is
by a day laborer, in consideration of groceries and provisions furnished
him and his family, and it covers all wages, past and future, due and to
become due, t6 the assignor from any person, firm or corporation, whatever, so long as the assignee's claim remains unpaid. .

.

.

Should the

law be declared to be that such an assignment is valid, it is not difficult
to see that it would open the door to improvidence and profusion on the
part of the assignor, and in the end to utter and hopeless poverty." 101
This language points the finger of condemnation only at general assign98. 75 Pa. 399 (1874). Judge Schuyler also discussed East Lewisburg Lumber
& Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 9I Pa. 96 (1879) and Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. 296 (1879), distinguishing them on the ground that there "the thing assigned was individuated, and
was the fruit of an employment existing at the time of the assignment." 116 Pa. 513,
516, g Atl. 58, 59 (1887).
99. However, the jury did find "that after October 8, i886, and after the service
of the last named notice, the defendant paid the amount in controversy to Eliza McDermott." Id. at 515, 9 Ati. at 59. It is interesting that the Judge did not regard this
as a finding of "acceptance" on the part of the defendant. In the Supreme Court, counsel for the railroad argued: "In our case the employer recognized the assignment and
actually paid the debt to the assignee." Id. at 521.
ioo. See note 98 supra.
ioI. 1I6 Pa. 513, 517-8, 9 Atl. 58, 6o (1887). The Judge's only reference to authority for his public policy argument is the following: "When the court[s] say to
the laborer that he shall not beggar himself and family by making merchandise of what
is virtually his entire wage-earning power, they merely extend to the laborer the same
rule which is applicable to the judges themselves, and to the officers of our army and
navy; for neither the salaries of the judges, nor the pay of these officers, may be
assigned, either by the party or by operation of law; and for the same reason to wit:
that it is against public policy that they should be: 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 1040." Id. at
519, 9 AtI. at 61. But if the "same rule" were applied to laborers as is applied to
public officials, all assignments of unearned wages, including those from present employment, would be contrary to public policy. 2 STORY, EQUITY JuRIsPRUDENcE (3d
ed. 1843) § 1040 (a); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 417; RFSTATEmENT,
CONTRACrS (932) § 547.
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ments covering all future wages, but it is not clear that the Judge would
take a different attitude toward assignments limited to earnings from
existing employment.
What the members of the Supreme Court, who reviewed the case,
thought of Judge Schuyler's public policy argument will never be
known; they neither approved it nor rejected it. The judgment below
was affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion reading as follows:
"The learned judge committed no error in entering judgment in
favor of the plaintiff below, on the special verdict. The attempt
was to assign that which had no existence, either substantial or
incipient. There was no foundation or contract on which an
indebtedness might arise. It was tlhe mere possibility of a subsequent acquisition of property. This is too vague and uncertain.
It cannot be sustained as a valid assignment and transfer of prop") 102
erty: Jermyn v. Moffitt. ....
According to the evidence in the reports, the Woodring case had
no particular effect on the course of judicial decision for twenty-five
years after it was decided. Apparently, the lower courts correctly interpreted it as authority for the invalidity of only those assignments which
purported to cover earnings from future employments. They continued
to give effect to assignments which were limited to wages from employment existing at the time of the assignment. 10 3 The public policy issue
dropped from notice until it was revived again in 19I4 by Judge Sultzberger, sitting in the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia. The manner in which it was raised was unusual.
In I9O9 Judge Sultzberger had held invalid, as class legislation, the
Small Loans Act of May II, 1909. 104 This was a simple act providing for the issuance of licenses to persons making loans of $200 or
It appears from the abstracts in the
102. II6 Pa. 513, 522, 9 Atl. 58, 61-2 (887).
report that the case was quite fully briefed and argued in the Supreme Court. Apparently counsel distinguished with some care between unearned wages from present employment and those from future employment. The public policy argument was used to
bolster the unassignability of the latter. Counsel for Woodring said: "The very cogent
reasons resulting from public policy, as they appear in the opinion of the court below
in this case and in Fairgrieves v. Lehigh Navigation Co., 2 Phila. 182, should influence
this court in refusing to extend the operation of equity powers beyond what has been
decided in Mulhall v. Quinn and Jermyn v. Moffitt. . . ." I6 Pa. at 522. See the
reference to the Mulhall case in note 9o supra.
103. Berresford v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 24 County Ct. 557 (C. P. Schuylkill
igoo); Sally v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 5 Dist. 316 (C. P. Jeff. I896) ;
Evans v. Kingston Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 351 (C. P. Luz. i89o);
McManaman v. Hanover Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) i8i (C. P. Luz.
189o). In the last case, Judge Rice instructed the jury: "Now, the right of McManaman to assign his wages to be earned in the future, in payment of a debt already due,
or of a debt to be incurred in the future is valid, provided, he was employed by the
company or person, or was about to be employed by the company or person, which or
whom he directs to pay his wages in payment of his indebtedness." Id. at 182. Cf.
Lenahan v. Kingston Coal Co., I6 Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep. 589 (C. P. Luz. 1913) where
the assignment purported to cover wages from existing and future employment.
Io4. (i9og) Pa. P. L. 518.
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less, :0 authorizing the rates to be charged in excess of the legal rate, 106
and providing that "no assignment or order for wages to be earned in
the future," given to secure a loan, should be valid against the employer,
unless accepted in writing by him. It also provided that no such assignment should be valid, when made by a married man, unless accompanied
by his wife's written consent. Judge Sultzberger thought this act
placed wage-earners in a separate class in violation of Article 3, section
7, of the state Constitution, 10 7 and consequently, in Application of Jefferson Credit Co.,' 08 he held it invalid.
After this decision and possibly because of it, the legislature made
another attempt to legalize and regulate the small-loans business. It
passed the so-called Loan Shark Law of 1913,109 which was very similar to the Act of I909. However, in the 1913 Law no provisions as
to wage assignments were included and the day before the Law was
passed the legislature enacted the Act of June 4, 1913,110 which contained provisions identical with the wage-assignment sections of the Act
of I9O9. No assignment of, or order for wages, given as security for a
loan, should be valid against the employer without his written acceptance and, in the case of a married employee, his wife's written consent
was required.
The Loan Shark Law came before Judge Sultzberger in Foster's
Application,"' which arose upon an application for a license to do business under the act. The Judge regarded the whole legislation, particularly the separate enactment of the wage-assignment provisions in the
Act of June 4, I913, as an effort by the legislature to circumvent his
decision in the Application of Jefferson Credit Co. It is not surprising,
therefore, that he reached the conclusion the legislature had again acted
unconstitutionally. The involved route by which he reached this conclusion can be summarized as follows: (i) the Loan Shark Law exempted from its operation the four established classes of money-lenders,
namely, banks, trust companies, building associations, and pawnbrokers.
105. Section i provided that no person "shall engage in the business of making
loans in sums of two hundred dollars or less, upon which any other charge is made
than the legal rate of interest, and for which no security other than a note or contract,
with or without indorser, is taken, without first obtaining a license" from the Clerk of
the Court of Quarter Sessions of the county where the business is located. Section 6
exempted from the provisions of the act national banks and all banks and loan companies under the supervision of the Banking Commissioner.
io6. Section 2 authorized a "brokerage fee" of 1o%, in addition to the legal rate
of interest.
107.. Article 3, section 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, provides, inter
alia, "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: . . . Fixing
the rate of interest."
ioS. i8 Dist. 634 (Q. S. Phila. 19o9).
iog. Act of June 5, 1913, Pa. P. L. 429. Unlike the Act of 19o9, the statute placed

no maximum limit upon loans covered by the law.
110. (1913) Pa. P. L. 405.
Ill. 23 Dist. 558 (Q. S. Phila. 1914).
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Consequently, it was the "avowed purpose" of the act to create a new
fifth class of loan business in which higher than the legal rate of interest
might be charged; (2) what the framers of the law had in mind, as
this new fifth class of money-lending, was the business of making loans
on the security of wages to be earned in the future and the wage assignment statute of June 4, 1913, was passed to legalize such security and
make possible the class of business on which the Loan Shark Law was
to operate; 112 (3) the "time-honored" rule of Pennsylvania law has
been that a man may not pledge his wages to be earned in the future and
the Act of June 4, I913, is invalid, because in violation of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights; (4) since the Act of June 4, 1913, is invalid and
a man may not pledge his wages to be earned in the future, there is no
constitutionally recognizable class of business to which the Loan Shark
Law may apply. Consequently, that law, like the Act of 19o9, is
invalid as class legislation.
What concerns us here is not the general validity of small-loans
legislation, but Judge Sultzberger's conclusion, basic to his decision,
that under prior Pennsylvania law a man could not pledge his future
wages, and to authorize him to do so would violate the Bill of Rights.
The Judge enumerated his reasons for this conclusion as follows:
"i. A legal pledge or assignment must be of something in existence. Potential existence in the future may, under certain conditions, give rise to equitable assignments, enforceable in chancery,
if they should be just in themselves and not contrary to public
policy.
"2. The policy of our Commonwealth protected against the
attachment of creditors wages even when already earned.
"3. This court had decided that a man cannot pledge or assign
wages to be earned in the future, because such a pledge or assignment creates a form of peonage or modified slavery in violation of
the Ist section of the Bill of Rights." 113
112. "In the light of what has been said, the purpose of the Act of June 4, 1913,
P. L. 405, seems quite clear. It was intended to destroy a time-honored rule of law and
to establish in its place one directly opposed to it. Men were to be allowed to pledge
the wages of their future labor for an indebtedness previously incurred. If this act
should be sustained as constitutional, a new branch of the money-lending business not
covered by established classes would have been created." Id. at 563. There is certainly nothing in the form or provisions of the Act of June 4th to suggest that this was
its purpose. It did not purport to legalize any transactions theretofore not legally
effective. On the contrary, it placed certain restrictions on effective wage assignments,
i.e. the requirements of written notice to the employer and written consent by the
employee's wife. These regulations as to the form of an effective assignment may have
been placed in an act separate from the Loan Shark Law, because the legislature desired the validity of that law to be determined independently of the validity of the
assignment regulations. This interpretation of legislative history is suggested by the
decision in Commonwealth v. Lynch, 22 Dist. 454 (Q. S. Blair 1913) which came
down a short time before the enactment of the Loan Shark Law. The decision sustained an indictment under the Small Loans Act of 19o9 and distinguished the Jefferson Credit Company case on the ground that it involved only the wage-assignment provisions of the igo9 Act, which were not involved in the Lynch case.
113. 23 Dist. 558, 562 (Q. S. Pahila. 1914).
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Let us consider these points in order, noting particularly any implied conclusion regarding the assignability of unearned wages from
existing employment. Under his first point, Judge Sultzberger referred
to two cases, East Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh 114 and
Ruple v. Bindley,115 observing that in both cases "there was an actual

subsisting contract at the bottom of the transaction." 116 This would
seem to imply recognition on the part of the Judge that his first point
would have no application to an assignment of wages from employment
which had been contracted at the time of the assignment.
He regarded as more substantial his second point, i. e. the policy
against the attachment of wages. This "policy" he found in the proviso of section 5 of the Act of April i5, 1845,117 to the effect "that the
wages of any laborers .

shall not be liable to attachment in the

.

hands of the employer." It is true that the purpose of this proviso
is "the preservation for employees and their families of the fruits of
mental or manual labor in order that their earnings may go to supply
their daily needs without hindrance from their creditors." 11 It is also
true, as the Judge pointed out, that an agreement of the employee to
waive the exemption of the statute is void."-" But the statute, by its
terms, applies only to attachment and it cannot properly be interpreted
as evidencing a more general and fundamental policy, which would
invalidate voluntary assignments. The Superior Court has pointed out
that the proviso in the Act of 1845 is "itself special legislation in favor
of a class" which "is not invalid because enacted prior to the Constitution of 1873."

It may be repealed at any time.' 2 °

No other case has

been found which makes the slightest suggestion that the attachment
legislation embodies a policy that would invalidate voluntary wage
assignments. 12 ' Judge Sultzberger's second point will not bear up
under analysis.
114. 9i Pa. 96 (1879) discussed in note 90 supra.
115. 91 Pa. 296 (1879) discussed at p. 41 supra.

116. 23 Dist. 558, 563 (Q. S. Phila. 194).
117. (1845)

Pa. P. L. 46o.
118. Bell v. Roberts, I5o Pa. Super. 469, 28 A. (2d) 715 (1942).

119. Morris Box Board Co. v. Rossiter, 30 Pa. Super. 23 (19o6); Firmstone v.
Mack, 49 Pa. 387 (1865). Both were cited by Judge Sultzberger.
12o. In Schmidt v. Schmidt and Erie R. R., 83 Pa. Super. 125 (1924) the court sustained the Act of May 8, 1876, P. L. 139, authorizing hotel and boarding-house keepers
to attach wages. Judge Keller said: "The Act of 1876, in our opinion, is not unconstitutional. . . . Its effect is only to repeal pro tanto the proviso in section 5 of the
Act of April 15, 1845, P. L. 46o.

.

.

. The proviso in the Act of 1845, exempting

wages and salaries from attachment was itself special legislation in favor of a class.
It is not invalid, because enacted prior to the Constitution of 1873; but an act which
tends to generalize such special legislation, by repealing its provisions in behalf of persons recognized as a proper subject of classification, will not be held to contravene the
constitutional provision against special legislation." Id. at 127-8.
121. In fact, the implication is just the contrary. See McManaman v. Hanover
Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 181 (C. P. Luz. 189o) ; Evans v. Kingston
Coal Co., 6 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 351 (C. P. Luz. 189o). In the latter case,
Judge Woodward referred to "the natural right of the workman to deal where he
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It is the third point regarding the Bill of Rights 122 which contains
the meat of the Judge's argument. 123 H-ere reliance is placed upon the
Jefferson Credit Company case and particularly Judge Schuyler's
opinion in the Woodring case.' 24 That opinion is devoted to a discussion of public policy at common law and makes no mention of the Constitution. Judge Sultzberger does not consider the Pennsylvania cases
which really have the most bearing on the possible application of the
Bill of Rights to wage assignments. They involved wage legislation,
such as the old Store Order Act and the Semi-Monthly Pay Act, and
interpret the Constitution as protecting, rather than restricting, the
right of the employee to dispose of his wage claims as he sees fit.

2

5

pleases" and said: "If, therefore, a laboring man, in the exercise of this right, transfers
to a merchant any portion of his wages as security for a store account that he is running up with the merchant, he is just as much bound by that transaction as any other
man would be." Id. at 353.
122. The provision referred to is Article i, section i, of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which reads: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation,
and of pursuing their own happiness."
123. "The ist section of the Bill of Rights is still a living force in this Commonwealth: Jefferson Credit Co.'s case, 18 Dist. R. 634. One of the inherent and indefeasible rights thereby guaranteed is the enjoyment and defense of liberty. It is a
declaration against slavery in any form, however modified or disguised. The distinction between a man's acquired estate (that is, his property) and his personal earning
power by labor (that is, his freedom) is carefully preserved and sedulously guarded.
A man may pledge his property, but not his person. However great may be the volume of police power entrusted to the legislature, it cannot extend to the impairment
of the mere right of a man, even though he be a debtor, to earn a living by labor and
to apply his earnings to the support of himself and his family. This right is so fundamental and so necessary, not only for himself and his family, but also for the Commonwealth, that it cannot be waived by the man himself. It is true that the freedom of
contract is a great and necessary right, but it has its limit. And this limit is reached
and passed when a man's future labor is pledged to pay his past debts, with the consequence that he and his family are rendered liable to fall from the status of free citizenship into the degradation of pauperism." Foster's Application, 23 Dist. 558, 564
(Q. S. Phila. 1914).
124. 116 Pa. 513, 9 AtI. 58 (1887).
125. The earliest case discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to wage
legislation is Godeharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 At. 354 (1886). The case involved the Store Order Act of June 29, 188I, Pa. P. L. 147, which required mining
and manufacturing companies to pay their employees once a month in money or cash
order. Plaintiff, a puddler, asked and received orders from the defendant employer to
various persons for the purchase of coal and other articles. These orders were honored by the merchants and defendant paid the bills. Plaintiff then sued for his wages
and defendant claimed a set-off. The court held that the act was unconstitutional as an
attempt to "prevent persons who are sid jiurs from making their own contracts."
Judge Gordon said that the act was "an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a
legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his
rights as a citizen of the United States." Id. at 437, 6 At. at 356. To similar effect
are decisions holding invalid the Semi-Monthly Pay Act of May 20, 1891, Pa. P. L.
96, which required mining and manufacturing companies to pay their employees semimonthly in cash and forbidding assignment of future wages payable semi-monthly
under the Act. Showalter v. Ehlan, 5 Pa. Super. 242 (1897) ; Sally v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 5 Dist. 316 (C. P. Jeff. 1896); Commonwealth v. Isenberg & Rowland, 4 Dist. 579 (0. S. Clearfield 1895); James Hamilton v. C. Jutte & Co.. 16
County Ct. 193 (C. P. Fayette 1895). Subsequent semi-monthly pay legislation (Act
of April 24, 1913, Pa. P. L. 114) has been sustained, but only on the ground that under
the statute the parties are free to contract for whatever mode of payment they desire,
and the form of payment specified in the statute applies only in the absence of agreement otherwise. Commonwealth v. Muller, 31 D. & C. 372 (Q. S. Lack. 1938) ; Commonwealth v. Lipschutz, ig D. & C. 415 (Q. S. Phila. 1933).
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The opinion in Foster's Application closes with the statement:
"After mature consideration, we cannot resist the conclusion that there
is no power of contract in the individual and no power of legislation in
the general assembly to authorize a man to pledge or assign the wages
of his future labor, and that the attempt of the legislature to exercise
such power is a futile assault upon the very basis of our frame of government." 128 Whether "wages of his future labor" means only wages
from future employment, or includes unearned wages from present employment, is not clear, but if it means the latter, the statement is not supported by the decisions of Pennsylvania, or of any other state so far as is
known. However, members of the bar may with justification hesitate
to disregard the decision in Foster's Application. Judge Sultzberger's
opinion, like that of Judge Schuyler in the Woodring case, stands in the
reports without having been repudiated in any subsequent case. Other
small-loans legislation has been enacted and sustained, but upon grounds
12 7
having no relation to the assignability of unearned wages.
IV

In the above discussion, Pennsylvania legal history has assumed
a prominent place, for we must know the past, if we are to consider
intelligently where we are and whither we go. It has beer made abundantly clear that one deficiency in the decisions has been the failure
of later opinions to assess the standing of earlier ones, a failure due,
no doubt, sometimes to fortuitous circumstance and other times to
lack of full presentation. The courts of Pennsylvania have yet to come
to grips with the modern problems of wage assignments. When they
do, there will be much to be clarified as to both (I) the effect of partial
assignments and (2) the assignability of unearned wages. It is now
appropriate to consider the problems of today and make some suggestions for the law of tomorrow. The law of the future may sometimes
be the special delight of law professors, but it is certainly also the concern of the bench and bar.
When consideration is given to the effect of a partial assignment
upon the debtor who has received notice, but has not assented, there are
two aspects of the problem which should be differentiated. The first is:
126. 23 Dist. 558, 564-5 (1914).
127. In Commonwealth v. Young, 248

Pa. 458, 94 Att. 141 (1915) the Loan Shark
Law of 1913 was held unconstitutional as class legislation, but no reference was made
to wage assignments or the Act of June 4, 1913. Thereafter, the decision in the
Foster case was affirmed per curiam on the authority of the Young case. Foster's License, 6o Pa. Super. 8 (1915). In Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129, 104 At. 5o5
(1918) the Small Loans Act of June 17, 1915, Pa. P. L. lO12, was sustained because
it was applicable only to loans of $3oo or less, which was regarded as a reasonable
classification. See also Equitable Loan Society, Inc. v. Bell, 339 Pa. 449, 14 A. (2d)
316 (194o) sustaining the Pawnbrokers' License Act of 1937, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 194I) § 281.

5o
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What procedure is available to the partial assignee, whereby he may
secure satisfaction of his claim from the debtor without risking loss of
the funds through their payment to a faithless or financially embarrassed assignor? The second is: Should the debtor be free, prior to
the institution of proceedings against him, to make full settlement with
the assignor who is the obligee named in the original undertaking? The
desirability of distinguishing between these aspects of our problem will
be made clear by a statement of the guiding considerations which must
govern any satisfactory solution of the partial assignment question.
The more ancient and venerable consideration-oft-repeated without critical analysis-is that a party to a contract ought not, because of
the contract, be subjected to burdens outside the scope of his undertaking. This proposition is fundamental to the law of assignments, total
as well as partial. But, obviously, the rabbit in the hat is the "scope"
of the debtor's undertaking. The early common law judges thought
that when a person contracted to pay Jones, he could not be compelled
to pay Smith, for his promise was to pay only Jones. Consequently,
even a total assignment did not give the assignee a cause of action
against the nonassenting debtor.' 28 However, the Chancellor thought
otherwise and permitted the total assignee to recover against the debtor.
29
In time, this view was completely accepted by the common law courts.1
Now, what interpretation of the debtor's undertaking did this imply?
The enforcement of a total assignment against the debtor involved two
possible risks for the debtor, not involved in an obligation to pay only
the assignor. The assignor might be a more lenient creditor than the
assignee, and if the debtor. became financially embarrassed he might
receive much less generous treatment from the assignee. Another risk
for the debtor was the possibility that a dispute might arise between the
assignor and assignee over the ownership of the claim, in which case
the debtor would be uncertain as to which party he should pay in order
to secure a discharge. It is true that the debtor might obtain a binding
adjudication of any such dispute through a proceeding in equity initiated by interpleader, but such a course would at least involve the burden
of employing counsel and going to court. The courts did not consider
these risks sufficiently substantial to justify withholding relief from
the total assignee; consequently, he was permitted to have his action
against the debtor. It was probably thought that if the debtor wished
128. See 7 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 515-523.
129. Of the various discussions of the law of assignments, the well-known articles

of Professors Cook and Williston are now classics: Cook, The Alienability of Choses
in Action (916)
29 HARV. L. REv. 816; Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee of a
Chose in Action Legal or Equitable? (1916) 30 HARV. L. REv. 97; Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Alction: A Reply to Professor Williston (1917) 30 HARv. L. Ray.
449; Williston, The Word "Equitable" and Its Application to the Assignment of Choses
in Action (1918) 31 H. v. L. REv. 822.
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to prevent such a result he should expressly make his contract nonassignable. In the absence of a provision" against assignment the
debtor's undertaking was interpreted to be to pay the original party or
his total assignee. With this interpretation vanished the question of
imposing burdens on the debtor beyond the scope of his original undertaking.
Why were first the equity courts and later the common law courts
so ready to extend the debtor's obligation beyond the letter of the contract? The answer seems to lie in the second guiding consideration
which commanded attention. There was obviously great social and
economic advantage in promoting the transferability of property and
the liquidity of money claims.1 30 The judges were not willing to have
the assignability of choses in action dependent upon an express contract
to that effect, when the absence of such a contract would be due in most
instances, not to the desire of the parties to have the claim nonassignable, but to lack of forethought on their part.
So much for the enforcement of total assignments. The problem
of the recognition of partial assignments was more complicated. If the
debtor promised to pay Jones $I 5o and Jones assigned $50 of this claim
to Smith, the common law judges were unwilling to hold that the debtor
now was under two separately enforcible obligations, one of $ioo to
Jones and another of $50 to Smith. And this time the Chancellor
agreed.' 3' How much this result was due simply to the technicalities
of pleading and procedure may be debatable; but there was certainly
more to it than that.13 2 Such recognition of a partial assignment would
impose upon the debtor the burdens involved in a total assignment,
plus others. He would not only have to settle with a different party
and run the risk of disputed ownership of the claim, but he would also
have to make two settlements instead of one, and face the possibility
of two suits instead of one. Neither the judges at common law nor
those in equity were willing to interpret the debtor's contract as authorizing this result and their conclusion was phrased in terms of the rule
forbidding one party to a contract "splitting a single cause of action"
without the consent of the other party. However, equity did not leave
the partial assignee without effective relief. He was permitted to sue
13o. "The fact therefore that a right under a contract was regarded by the common law as a purely personal relationship was no bar to the adoption by the court of
Chancery of a very different view. In fact that court regarded the right to receive a
definite sum under a contract as property, and therefore assignable either inter vivos
or after death. Perhaps both the early association of the Chancery with mercantile
business, and the far more liberal conception which from the first it had held as to the
enforceability of agreements, helped it to arrive at this conclusion." 5 HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH . AW (2d ed. 1937) 334-5.
131. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 442-3.
132. See James v. City of Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 371, 8 N. E. 122, 123 (1886).
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and recover in a proceeding against the debtor who had not paid, provided the assignor was joined in the suit. Since the debtor was thus
subjected to only one suit and could secure a discharge by one settlement, i. e. by paying the total amount of his obligation into court, he was
placed under burdens no greater than those resulting from the recognition of a total assignment. Also, the partial assignee's interest was substantially promoted by enabling him to recover directly from the debtor
at the ordinarily slight inconvenience of having to join the assignor.
For the most part, the American law of assignment has developed
in the manner just outlined. When we look to the decisions outside
of Pennsylvania, we find complete agreement on the proposition that a
partial assignee may not recover the assigned portion of the claim from
the debtor in a proceeding (such as the old action at common law)
which would leave the debtor liable to the assignor to recover the remainder of the debt.' 83 This was the real basis of Justice Story's decision in Mandeville v. Welch 184 and, for the very sufficient reasons
already outlined, it has not been undermined. On the other hand, the
courts in almost all the states have come to the conclusion that the partial assignee may recover from the debtor in a proceeding in equity, or in
an action under modern code procedure, in which the assignor and other
parties in interest may be joined. 135 There are decisions in one or two
states, other than Pennsylvania, taking the position that the partial
assignee may not recover from the nonassenting debtor either at law
or in equity.' 3 6 Apparently, these decisions resulted from a misinterpretation of the argument against splitting a cause of action, which was
given leading prominence by Mandeville v. Welch. They cannot now
be justified, either by consideration on the merits, or by the course of
authority.
Where do the courts of Pennsylvania stand on this question, which
is fundamental, not only to wage assignments, but to all partial assignments? If it is true, as Justice Kephart stated in the Sterling Colnpany case, 13 7 that in Pennsylvania a partial assignment does not bind
133.
(1932)

2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 442-3; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 156; Note, Partial Assignments (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 129, reprinted in

SELECTED READINGS ON CONTRACTS (1931)

86o.

Gibson v. Cooke, 2o Pick 15 (Mass.

1838) ; Gilman v. Raymond, 235 Mass. 284, 127 N. E. 794 (1920).
134. 5 Wheat. 277 (U. S. 1820).
135. See authorities cited in notes 132, 133 supra. The time is past when we need
be squeamish about stating that the partial assignee has a cause of action subject only
to the procedural requirement of correct joinder of parties. The New York courts
have reached this position. Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209
N. Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dep't 1925), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 523, 155 N. E. 881 (1926) ; Schwartz
v. Horowitz, 131 F. (2d) 5o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Grosner v. Abramson, 162 Misc.
731, 295 N. Y. Supp. 372 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
136. See Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 59 S. W. (2d) 746 (Mo.
27 WASH. U. L. Q. io6.
App. 1933) ; Note, PartialAssignments in Missouri (94)
137. 319 Pa. 174, 179 At. 234 (935).
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the nonassenting debtor in any way and in order for the partial assignee
to recover the assent of the.debtor must be averred and proven, then, at
the late date of 1935, this jurisdiction joined a small company in error.
Furthermore, it did so without the justification of precedent for, as the
above review has shown, the earlier Pennsylvania cases took the sounder
38
and more generally accepted view.'
There remains for consideration what was referred to above as the
second phase of the partial assignment problem: May a debtor with
notice disregard a partial assignment and obtain a discharge by settlement with the assignor alone? Of course, if the assignment does not
bind the debtor in any way and the assignee may not proceed against
him either at law or in equity, the answer is obviously in the affirmative.
But should the result be different if it is held, as practically all the courts
do, that the partial assignee may recover against the debtor in equity or
under the modern codes? Here an important distinction should exist
between a settlement made after suit is brought against the debtor and
one made before. If the assignee has brought suit against the debtor
and joined the assignor there would seem to be no justification for
permitting the debtor to obtain a discharge by payment to the assignor,
which would jeopardize the interest of the assignee, for a discharge
could just as readily be obtained by payment into court, which would
protect the interests of all parties. 13 9 However, if suit has not been
brought, the debtor can protect the interest of the assignee only by (i)
making separate settlements with assignor and assignee, or (2) joining
those parties in a proceeding instituted by interpleader. Either course
will involve the debtor in risks or burdens which do not exist when
payment into court in a proceeding already pending is the only move
he need make.
There are not many cases which involve the right of the debtor to
disregard a partial assignment and make settlement with the assignor.
Most of the decisions there are on the subject take the view that the recognition by the courts of an equitable right in the assignee precludes the
debtor with notice from settling with his original creditor, the
138. See the citations and discussion note 55 supra.
139.

It does not follow from this statement that the Sterling Company case, 319

Pa. 174, 179 Atl. 234 ('935), was incorrectly decided.

That case involved settlement

with the debtor (the insurance company) after suit had been instituted by the partial
assignee (Lofland) and others. But the settlement was made by an equity receiver of
the assignor acting for the assignor's creditors generally; it was subject to court approval, and the partial assignee's interest was protected in the distribution of proceeds
which the court directed. This is quite different from a settlement made by the
assignor alone, acting in his own interest and not subject to court supervision. However, Justice Kephart's broad language would seem to indicate that the debtor would
be discharged by the latter type of settlement just as fully as by the settlement before
the court.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

54

assignor.140 This view is approved by Professor Williston '41 and the
American Law Institute, 1 4 2 but the issue remains unsettled in most
states and it is not too late to ask what reasoning dictates such a conclusion. Professor Williston and the courts which accept his view argue
that to give the debtor a discharge on account of payment to the assignor
would be "inconsistent with a recognition of any equitable right in the
partial assignee." 114 This amounts to saying that, as against the
debtor, the partial assignee must be treated in equity as the owner of a
separate claim or he must be regarded as having no right. The general
development of the law of assignment and the considerations back of it
are against any such dichotomy. The above discussion should have
made clear that it is not at all inconsistent to hold that the debtor has a
right of settlement with the assignor prior to suit and at the same time
to recognize an equitable right in the partial assignee to recover against
the debtor who has not paid, provided all parties in interest may be
joined in the suit.' 4 4 In fact, the assertion of inconsistency ignores the
fundamental point of view of equity that partial assignments should be
sustained only when it can be done without substantialdetriment to the
debtor.

45

Supporters of the view espoused by Professor Williston apparently
believe that any question of detriment to the debtor is disposed of simply
by pointing out: "The debtor can bring the entire fund into court, and
14o. Graham v. Southern Ry., 173 Ga. 573, 161 S. E. 125 (1931) ; Todd v. Meding,
56 N. J.Eq. 83, 38 Atl. 349 (897), re7/d on other grounds, 56 N. J. Eq. 820, 41 Atl.
222 (1898) ; Brill v. Tuttle, 8I N. Y. 454, 457 (188o) ; Doyle v. East New York Savings Bank, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 318 (N. Y. Mun. Ct 1943), af'd,44 N. Y. S. (2d) 328
(2d Dep't 1943), appeal denied, 266 App. Div. 922, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (2d Dep't

1943) ; Note (1932) 8o A. L. R. 413, 421.
141. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936)
142. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 156.
143. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936)

§ 444.

§ 444. (Italics supplied.) In Todd
v. Meding, 56 N. J. Eq. 83, 38 Atl. 349 (1897) it is said: "It is too late to dispute the
proposition that a part of a debt may be effectually assigned in equity. The qualifying
rule that such an assignment cannot be enforced by action at law without the acceptance or assent of the debtor does not vary the result. The qualifying rule avails the
debtor only to the extent that if he wishes to dispute the existence of the debt, he is
entitled to make his defence in a single suit, and cannot be subjected to several suits
at law. But it does not justify him in ignoring the partial assignment, after he has
notice of it, and paying the whole sum to the original creditor. To so hold would be
to nullify the doctrine which sanctions partial assignments." Id. at 92, 38 Atl. at 352.
144. Of course, it must be recognized that the right of the debtor to settle with the
assignor greatly limits the value of an assignment to which the debtor has not assented.
But the burden should be on the assignee to obtain such assent, if he wishes to rely
upon an obligation completely binding the debtor.
145. Section 151 of the Restatement of Contracts states: "A right may be the
subject of effective assignment unless, (a) the substitution of a right of the assignee
for the right of the assignor would vary materially the duty of the obligor, or increase
materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract, or impair materiallv
his chance of obtaining return performance . .. ." Note also the following statement in a leading case frequently cited as supporting the maximum enforcibility of
partial assignments: "We think, upon reason and principle, partial assignments should
be sustained in a court of chancery, in all cases when it can be done without detriment
to the debtor or stakeholder, whenever equitable and just results may be accomplished
by it.' National Exchange Bank of Boston v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498, 5o6 (1882).
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run no risks as to its proper distribution. If he be in no fault, no cost
need be imposed upon him, or they may be awarded in his favor. If he
be put to extra trouble in keeping separate accounts, he can, if it is reasonable, be compensated for it." 140 It has already been questioned
whether or not in any case the debtor, in order to preserve his right to
single settlement, should have the burden of taking the matter to court.
Even reimbursement for court costs and counsel fees may not adequately compensate him for time and trouble involve d in such a proceeding. However this may be, payment of the fund into court is certainly no solution for the employer who must decide whether or not to
honor a typical wage assignment.
The most 'common form of modern wage assignment calls for the
payment each pay day of a stated sum to the assignee. If the employer
is to meet the responsibility of honoring such an assignment he must be
prepared to remit to the assignee and adjust wage payments accordingly at the end of each payroll period-usually two weeks or a month.
Furthermore, he must continue to do this, not two or three times, but
for so long as the assignment remains effective. In the case of many
assignments, such as those for hospital insurance, the cooperating employer must continue to remit to the assignee as long as the assignor
remains in his employ. Also, under modern conditions of unionization,
the arrangement may well result from a plan covering all employees and
the employer is presented with a few hundred or even thousand assignments. The accounting burden is likely to be substantial and it is obvious that the employer cannot escape it by taking his payroll to court
each pay day. Anxious as- the chancellor may be to adapt the law to
changing conditions, he will not and cannot become paymaster for the
employee. To say that the employer may readily be compensated for
his extra expense is to ignore the realities of the situation. To attempt
to estimate the expense and allocate it to the various assignments may
be the source of serious disputes with the employees; and if this difficulty
is surmounted the employer- may not even be in a position to obtain the
additional office help which will be required. All of this amply justifies the conclusion that a wage assignment should not prevent the employer from continuing to pay the full wages to the employee, unless he
indicates his willingness to honor the assignment.
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina support this conclusion. In Pacific Mills v. Textile Workers' Union,'47 the
employer, having declined to agree to the "check-off," refused to deduct
union dues from employees' wages. Thereupon, union members made
146. National Exchange Bank of Boston v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498, 505 (1882).
147. 197 S. C. 330, 15 S. E. (2d) 134 (1941), 41 COL. L. REv. 1439, (942)

MICH. L. REv. 455.
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some IIOO wage assignments to the union of $i each per month. The
employer refused to honor the assignments and sued in equity to enjoin
their enforcement. The court recognized the general rule in South Carolina to be that a debtor with notice is bound in equity by a partial
assignment whether he assents to it or not. But a majority of the court
pointed out that this rule would apply only "if no legal reason appears
why it [the assignment] should not be given force and effect." 148 The
employer showed that the clerical services of one person six hours per
week would be required to honor the assignments. The court regarded
this burden as sufficient to justify the decision that the assignments were
void and of no effect as against the employer. The same conclusion
was reached in Orr Cotton Mills v. St. Mary's Hospital.149 In that
case, fifteen employees had executed assignments to the hospital, ranging from $i to $IO per month.

These decisions should receive approval as correct applications of
the general principle that a right may not be the subject of effective
assignment, if "the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right
of the assignor would vary materially the duty of the obligor, or increase
materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract." 150 It
is true that the burden placed upon the employer by his recognition of
wage assignments will differ with the type and number of assignments
involved. Because of this, some may argue that the view of the South
Carolina court should be limited to the more burdensome assignments.
But the inevitable uncertainty which would result from the application
of such a rule would largely, if not completely, destroy its utility. The
value of an assignment which binds the debtor lies in the fact that the
assignee may look to the debtor as well as the assignor for payment.
This value amounts to little if in many cases the effect of the assignment on the debtor cannot be determined without a court decision.
Consequently, the view should be adopted that no wage assignment will
impose upon the employer the burden of separate settlements, in the absence of action on his part which indicates assent. Thus, we are brought
to the conclusion that Fairgrievesv. Lehigh Navigation Co. I 5 ' should
still be regarded as correctly decided on its facts.
Attention may now be directed briefly to the assignability of
unearned wages. This question should not cause difficulty, when it is
presented to a Pennsylvania court which does not feel bound by the
views expressed in the Fairgrievescase and in Foster's Application."2
148. 197 S. C. 330, 341, 15 S. E. (2d) 134, 138 (1941).
149. 203 S. C. 114, 26 S. E. (2d) 408 (1943).
I5o. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § I5I, quoted in part in note 145 supra.
151. 2 Phila. 182 (Pa. I856).
152. 23 Dist. 558 (Q. S. Phila. 1914).

WAGE ASSIGNMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA

So far as public policy at common law is concerned, courts and commentators are generally agreed that an assignment of a debt not yet due
should be sustained if such assignment is limited to debts arising from a
contract or an employment in existence at the time of the assignment.
In the case of unearned wages the existing employment may be either
for a term or at will. 1 53 There is no sufficiently cogent reason why this
well-settled doctrine should be rejected in Pennsylvania. It is true that
it enables the employee to burden his future earning power, but the
power to borrow does that in the case of .any conscience debtor and the
burden is one that may be discharged in bankruptcy. 154 There may well
be reason for restricting the amount of an effective assignment to a portion of the assignor's wages or its duration to a period of years, but
these limitations raise questions of policy properly within the sphere of
the legislature and not for judicial decision at common law.
There is even less justification for holding that an assignment of
unearned wages violates a general constitutional guarantee of liberty
and property, such as that contained in the Bill of Rights. The privilege to make such an assignment means greater freedom, not lessgreater freedom to borrow money and to secure what is in effect preWhat has already been said in criticism of Judge
payment of wages.'
render unnecessary further elaboration of
should
Sultzberger's views
6
15
this point.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the wage assignment problem is
badly in need of comprehensive reconsideration in Pennsylvania, and
upon reconsideration the common law should be restated along the following lines: (i) wages, earned or unearned, arising from an employment in existence at the time of the assignment, may be effectively
assigned; (2) an assignment, of which the employer has notice but
to which he has not consented, entitles the assignee to recover from the
employer in a proceeding in which all parties in interest are joined, provided the employer has not settled with the assignor prior to the suit;
(3) prior to the institution of proceedings against him, the employer,
,53. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 413; RE-STATEMENT, CONTRACTS
, 547; 6 C. J. S. 1063-5; 4 Am. JUR. 260. No attempt will be made
(1932) §§ 154,
here to discuss the effect of a purported assignment of wages to be earned from future
employment. See Note (938) I16 A. L. R. 955.
154. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (934), holding that an assignment
of wages to be earned under an existing employment did not create a "lien!' within the
meaning of Section 67 (d) of the Bankruptcy Act which would survive the employee's
discharge in bankruptcy and attach to his wages earned thereafter. The decision was
not based upon any general public policy against wage assignments, but upon the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to free the bankrupt's future earning power from the
claims of his creditors. It casts no doubt upon the general effectiveness of wage assignments in the absence of bankruptcy.
155. See note 125 supra.
156. See p. 48 supra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

who has not consented 157 to the assignment, may obtain a complete discharge by settlement in full with the assignor, although he has notice of
the assignment.
To avoid possible misunderstanding it may be well to point out that
so long as an assignment remains in effect the employer is free to honor
it if he chooses. Thus, if an assignment is irrevocable by its terms and
the assignor attempts by unilateral action to revoke it, the employer may
nevertheless obtain a discharge by making payments to the assignee in
accordance with the assignment. This is simply a recognition of the
fact that the assignment is binding on the assignor, although it may not
obligate the employer to settle separately with the assignor and
assignee. 158
But there is need for more than judicial clarification of the law in
Pennsylvania.

There is still on the books the Act of June 4, 1913,159

requiring written notice to the employer and the written consent of the
employee's wife, which act was held unconstitutional in Foster's Application.160 It has been shown that the case is of doubtful authority,
although it has never been overruled or affirmed. 161 The legislature
should give consideration to the enactment of legislation comprehensively regulating wage assignments. To discuss the possible provisions of such legislation would unduly extend this article, and attention will merely be called to the fact that several states have wage assign162
ment laws which might be made the basis of a Pennsylvania act.
There is no doubt, however, that both judicial and legislative action is
required to bring the Pennsylvania law of wage assignments abreast
of the times.
157. It may well be held that an employer who honors an assignment by making
payments to the assignee has sufficiently indicated his assent to the assignment to be
bound by it and thus prevented from thereafter settling with the assignor. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 423; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §162;
Strausser v. Taylor & Co., 2 Kulp (Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep.) 214 (C. P. Schuylkill 1881).

158. See note I2 supra. It is also true that if an assignment is revocable by its

terms and the employee has notified the employer of the revocation, the employer must

recognize the termination of the assignment and act accordingly. See Wood's Estate,
243 Pa. 211, 89 Atl. 975 (1914).
An assignment may be revocable, not because it expressly so states, but because it is part of a revocable arrangement between assignor
and assignee. An example is a partial assignment of wages for the payment of union
dues which may be revoked by the employee withdrawing from the union. Fisher v.
Stevens Coal Co., 143 Pa. Super. 115, 17 A. (2d) 642 (194o).
159. (1913) P. L. 405.
16o. 23 Dist. 558 (Q. S. Phila. 1914).

161. See p. 49 supra. It is also worthy of note that legislation in other states,

similar to the Pennsylvania Act of June 4, 1913, has generally been sustained. Mutual
Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225 (1911) ; Morris v. Holshouser, 220 N. C. 293, 17
S. E. (2d) 115 (1941) ; Note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 872; 4 Am. JuR. 262 (1936).
162. See, for example, the Illinois legislation enacted in 1935, ILL. ANN. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1944) c. 48, §§ 39.1-.9, which is discussed in (1936) 30 ILL. L.
REV. 759. General discussion of wage assignment legislation may be found in Fortas,
Wage Assignments in Chicago (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 526; Strasburger, The Wage
Assignment Problem (1935) 19 MINI. L. REV. 536; (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 581.

A summary of statutory provisions is to be found in Fortas, op. cit. at 551-8 and in
Strasburger, op. cit. at 539-541.

